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A Restatement of Copyright Law as 
More Independent and Stable Treatise 
Ann Bartow† 
INTRODUCTION: IT’S COMPLICATED 
Copyrights are really complicated. Copyrights provide 
the owner, usually the creator of the copyrighted work at least 
initially, with legal rights, but the rights can have uncertain 
boundaries.1 “Copyright law” technically derives from the federal 
Copyright Act and a host of federal court opinions. It also has a 
profound social meaning that only sporadically maps the actual 
statutory and jurisprudential prescriptions. Some simple 
misconceptions about copyright law result from lack of exposure 
to basic information.2 Examples include a belief that holding a 
copyright requires filing paperwork with the government, which 
has not been true since early 1978,3 and the false impression that 
if one credits an author whose work is copied, the copying cannot 
be copyright infringement4 (or the reverse, that failing to credit an 
author of a work is a copyright infringement, which is also 
incorrect5). Others come about through acts of exaggeration or 
outright deception, such as the fear that making a single 
unauthorized copy of a song will bring the F.B.I to one’s doorstep, 
 
 † Professor of Law, Pace Law School of Pace University. The author thanks 
the ALI and Brooklyn Law School for prompting this project, with particular gratitude 
to Prof. Anita Bernstein. This article is dedicated to Casey Bartow-McKenney and an 
adorable little dog named Dobby. 
 1 See generally Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2010). 
 2 See generally Common Copyright Myths, CASE W. RES. U., 
http://library.case.edu/copyright/cmyths.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013); Jonathan Bailey, 5 
Important Copyright Misconceptions The Linger, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2012/10/15/important-copyright-misconceptions-that-
linger/. For basic information about copyright law see, e.g., Taking the Mystery Out of 
Copyright, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/copyrightmystery/text/ (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
 3 Copyright Basics, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 4 See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-553, 90 Stat 2541, 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2012). See e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, LTD., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).  
 5 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Disco Azteca Distribs., Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 
1178 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
458 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
a notion propagated by the music industry to discourage 
infringing acts of music downloading.6 
Even fairly astute and proactive people can have a difficult 
time comprehending the complexities of various copyright 
doctrines. Consider how easy it is to misapprehend the work for 
hire doctrine even with a copy of the Copyright Act available. A 
smart and motivated lay person might decide to research the 
copyright ramifications of hiring an artist to paint a portrait of 
her adorable dog, and read the following: 
§ 201. Ownership of copyright 
(a) Initial Ownership. – Copyright in a work protected under this 
title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors 
of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the work. 
(b) Works Made for Hire. – In the case of a work made for hire, the 
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is 
considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the 
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument 
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright. 
This makes it sound like the person commissioning the 
painting, because she is the person for whom the work is 
prepared, will be considered the author of the work even though 
someone else has fixed it in a tangible medium of expression.7 
Given the words “Copyright in a work protected under this title 
vests initially in the author or authors of the work” it therefore 
sounds like she will, as the statutorily designated “author” (even 
though she has not picked up a paintbrush) own the copyright in 
the painting as well as the painting itself, once the transaction is 
completed. She will see that the first clause of 201(b) limits its 
application to “the case of a work made for hire.” But nothing 
anywhere within the text of this statutory provision warns the 
reader to check the definition of “Works Made for Hire” in 
Section 101 of the Copyright Act where one learns that:  
 
 
 
 6 Marc Fisher, Download Uproar: Record Industry Goes After Personal Use, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
12/28/AR2007122800693.html; Kashmir Hill, Will the New ‘Copyright Alert System’ Actually 
Stop People From Downloading Music and Movies Illegally?, FORBES (Feb. 25, 2013, 3:43 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/02/25/copyright-alert-system/; Study: Legal 
Fears Scare Away Downloaders, BILLBOARD, http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/
1439107/study-legal-fears-scare-away-downloaders (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 7 Legal Info. Inst., Fixed in a Tangible Medium of Expression, CORNELL.EDU, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fixed_in_a_tangible_medium_of_expression (last 
updated Aug. 19, 2010). 
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A “work made for hire” is— 
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or 
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution 
to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an 
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, 
if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them 
that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. For the purpose 
of the foregoing sentence, a “supplementary work” is a work prepared 
for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for 
the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising, 
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as 
forewords, afterwords, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, 
editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, 
bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and an “instructional text” 
is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and 
with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities. 
It is only after reading and processing this definition 
that the person commissioning the painting could hope to 
understand that unless she qualifies as the painter’s employer, 
she cannot be the author of the work (and therefore the 
copyright owner) via the work for hire doctrine. She may be 
specially ordering or commissioning the painting, and she and 
the artist may produce and sign a detailed written agreement 
concerning the painting, but the painting still does not fit 
within any of the nine enumerated work for hire categories 
listed within the statute.8 In consequence the “work for hire” 
option is not available to her.  
She can still independently negotiate a transfer of the 
copyright from the painter as part of the deal she strikes when 
she commissions the work, but nothing in this part of the 
Copyright Act draws attention to this option. First she needs to 
understand that she has to buy the copyright separately from the 
painting, which actually is explained fairly clearly within Section 
202 of the statute, if she knows what she is looking for, as follows: 
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a 
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which  
 8 See generally Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) 
(holding that agency law was the appropriate source for a definition of employee for 
copyright purposes, and therefore sculptor was not an “employee,” and thus the work 
for hire doctrine did not apply). A commissioned painting would not ordinarily 
constitute a contribution to a collective work, a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, a translation, a supplementary work, a compilation, an instructional text, a test, 
answer material for a test, or an atlas. Works Made for Hire, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2014). 
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the work is embodied. Transfer of ownership of any material object, 
including the copy or phonorecord in which the work is first fixed, 
does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied 
in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of 
ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright 
convey property rights in any material object. 
But that does not explain whether or how she can 
acquire the copyright in the painting from the artist. For that 
information she needs to head back to Section 201(d) of the 
Copyright Act, titled “Transfer of Ownership,” to learn that: 
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in 
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be 
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable 
laws of intestate succession. 
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including 
any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be 
transferred as provided by clause (1) and owned separately. The 
owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of 
that right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the 
copyright owner by this title. 
And even once she figures out how to acquire the copyright, 
she still will not know, because it is not something anyone would be 
likely to predict or intuit, that as the statutory author, the artist, or 
the artist’s heirs can effectively repossess the copyright in the 
painting approximately 35 years after the transfer using 
termination rights established in Section 203 of the Copyright Act. 
Nothing in the other statutory provisions she consulted would be 
likely to point her in that direction. She would have to read the 
relevant and rather convoluted textual provisions of the Act, and 
understand that Congress wanted to make sure that authors or 
their heirs would be able to recapture their copyrights and have a 
second opportunity to capitalize on them.9 
To untangle the practical applications of the work for 
hire doctrine, one would need to look at court opinions to chart 
the ways in which the work for hire doctrine has functioned or led 
to disputes under a variety of factual situations. Consultation 
with an interpretative guide such as a treatise or Restatement 
could be an efficient way to parse this out, at least initially. If the 
guide was accurate, straightforward, and comprehensive, using it 
 
 9 Brian D. Caplan & Jonathon J. Ross, United States Copyright Termination 
Rights: What Does the Future Have in Store?, 5 LANDSLIDE, January/February 2013, at 
14; Larry Rother, A Copyright Victory 25 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/11/arts/music/a-copyright-victory-35-years-later.html. 
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would be a smart and productive first step. Unfortunately, no 
such guide exists.  
I. “EXPERIENCE HAS TWO THINGS TO TEACH: THE FIRST IS 
THAT WE MUST CORRECT A GREAT DEAL; THE SECOND 
THAT WE MUST NOT CORRECT TOO MUCH.”10 
Copyright law needs to undergo simplifying reform. On 
this point at least, most stakeholders and commentators—
authors, publishers, distributors, technologists, lawyers, 
academics and consumers—seem to agree.11 Maria A. Pallante, 
Register of Copyrights of the United States Copyright Office, 
recently informed the House Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet: 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 
the state of our copyright law. My message is simple. The law is 
showing the strain of its age and requires your attention. As many 
have noted, authors do not have effective protections, good faith 
businesses do not have clear roadmaps, courts do not have sufficient 
direction, and consumers and other private citizens are increasingly 
frustrated. The issues are numerous, complex, and interrelated, and 
they affect every part of the copyright ecosystem, including the public 
at large. For reasons that I will explain, Congress should approach the 
issues comprehensively over the next few years as part of a more 
general revision of the statute. A comprehensive effort would offer an 
occasion to step back and consider issues both large and small, as well 
as whether and how they relate to the equities of the statute as a 
whole. This Subcommittee in particular has an opportunity to do what 
it has done in the past, not merely to update particular provisions of 
copyright law, but to put forth a forward-thinking framework for the 
benefit of both culture and commerce alike. 
 . . .  
I think it is time for Congress to think about the next great copyright 
act, which will need to be more forward thinking and flexible than 
before. Because the dissemination of content is so pervasive to life in 
the 21st century, the law also should be less technical and more 
helpful to those who need to navigate it. Certainly some guidance 
could be given through regulations and education. But my point is, if 
 
 10 Eugene Delacroix, in THE HARPER BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (Robert I. 
Fitzhenry ed., 3rd ed. 1993). 
 11 See generally Litman, supra note 1; Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary 
Thoughts On Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551 (2007); see also ROBERT 
LEVINE, FREERIDE: HOW DIGITAL PARASITES ARE DESTROYING THE CULTURE BUSINESS, 
AND HOW THE CULTURE BUSINESS CAN FIGHT BACK (2011); JASON MAZZONE, 
COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (2011); WILLIAM 
PATRY, HOW TO FIX COPYRIGHT (2012); cf. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). 
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one needs an army of lawyers to understand the basic precepts of the 
law, then it is time for a new law.12  
Unsurprisingly, most copyright stakeholders pushing 
for changes to the current copyright law are driven by self-
interest, and their tools for legal reform are forged by 
instrumentalism, rather than neutrality. One of the central 
theoretical debates within copyright law is whether 
incentivizing the creation and distribution of new works is best 
achieved with high or low levels of protection. Though some 
empirical work exists, for the most part proponents of both 
sides of the debate rely largely on analytic persuasiveness to 
make their cases.13 
One might expect staunch fidelity to one pole position or 
the other by most players. Yet as a practical matter, few copyright 
stakeholders evince a consistent viewpoint on the optimal height at 
which statutory barriers should be constructed.14 For example, 
while most copyright holders favor strong protections for the works 
to which they hold copyrights, they overwhelmingly prefer weak 
protections for the works of others whose copyrights they are 
accused of infringing. Alternatively, creative consumers can make 
powerful arguments about the debilitating effect that copyright 
maximalism has upon free speech and the diffusion of culture 
when they invest their own time, talents, and sweat equity in user-
generated content such as audiovisual mashups15 or fan fiction.16 
 
 12 The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2013) (statement of Maria A. Pallante, Reg. of Copyrights, U.S. 
Copyright Office) (emphasis added), available at http://www.copyright.gov/regstat/2013/
regstat03202013.html#_ftn1. 
 13 See, e.g., Ryan Radia, A Balanced Approach to Copyright, CATO UNBOUND (Jan. 
11, 2013), http://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/01/11/ryan-radia/balanced-approach-copyright. 
 14 See, e.g., Brandon Butler, Great Fair Use Advice From Reed Elsevier 
(Seriously!), ARL POLICY NOTES, http://policynotes.arl.org/post/53359448111/great-fair-
use-advice-from-reed-elsevier-seriously (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 15 Mash-up Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
mash-up (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); Ryan B., Mashup: A Fair Use Defense, YALE L. & TECH. 
(Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.yalelawtech.org/ip-in-the-digital-age/mashup-a-fair-use-defense/; 
Phil Morse, Over to You: Is It Legal to DJ with Unofficial Mashups and Remixes?, DIGITAL 
DJ TIPS (May 8, 2011), http://www.digitaldjtips.com/2011/05/over-to-you-is-it-legal-to-dj-
with-unofficial-mashups-and-remixes/. 
 16 Fan Fiction Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/fan+fiction?s=t (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: 
Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997); 
Jane Litte, Q&A with Professor Rebecca Tushnet, DEAR AUTHOR (Mar. 21, 2012), 
http://dearauthor.com/features/essays/qa-with-professor-rebecca-tushnet/; see also Nick 
Gillespie & Joshua Swain, Fan Fiction vs. Copyright – Q&A with Rebecca Tushnet, 
REASON.COM (July 20, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2012/07/20/fan-fiction-vs-
copyright-qa-with-rebecca. 
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Their rhetoric is less compelling, though, when it is applied to the 
unauthorized downloading of a song simply to avoid the 99 cent 
purchase price.17 
There is an embedded and similarly seemingly 
intractable dispute about the specificity and applicability of the 
individual stipulations that are, or should be, imposed by 
copyright law. Statutory provisions that are drafted to be 
precise and unambiguous offer clarity, but may also impose 
unreasonable rigidity upon dynamic creative relationships best 
served by malleable laws that offer the widest range of 
interpretive options. To demonstrate: distilling the scope of fair 
use, the doctrine allowing some unauthorized use of 
copyrighted works, into percentages or word counts is 
potentially liberating to creators who like to weave snippets of 
existing works into their own. As long as they stay within 
statutorily constructed metes and bounds of a granularly 
iterated fair use statute, they have nothing to fear from 
infringement suits. Some kinds of works, such as musical 
compositions that utilize short samples of existing songs, or 
literary works relying on brief quotations, would flourish. But the 
same approach could prove completely incapacitating to 
prospective fair users who need more than snippets of existing 
works to craft effective transformative works of their own, such as 
parodists, biographers, and historians. To illustrate this in a 
different way, explicitly legalizing the unauthorized appropriation 
of 10% or less of a work as a bright line alternative to the current 
fair use provision of the Copyright Act might prove very generous 
to someone seeking to transform portions of a 1,000 page novel, 
but devastatingly miserly to the putative transformer of a 
painting or a photograph. 
Copyright law is comprised of a dauntingly long and 
complicated governing statute, and an immense body of case 
law. It is not surprising that there is a healthy market for 
interpretative guides to copyright law! Even people who 
dedicate substantial portions of their professional lives to 
teaching and researching copyright law find copyright treatises 
helpful sometimes, and reasonably so. Copyright treatises can 
 
 17 The discourse around unauthorized music downloading is complicated, and 
there are certainly times when doing so constitutes fair use, or a de minimis civil 
infraction at worst. My point is simply that making unauthorized literal copies just to 
avoid small fees is less defensible than transformative uses, not that it is in any sense 
indefensible. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) 
(holding that while “transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair 
use, the goal of copyright . . . is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works”) (internal citations omitted). 
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serve the important function of providing an efficient starting 
point for researching a point of doctrine. When a copyright 
treatise is routinely also the end point of research, however, 
analytic capture by the treatise author is facilitated, potentially 
short-circuiting healthy debate on particular issues and ignoring 
the concerns of some of the stakeholders. 
Law professors can have a unique role in the 
development of any area of the law because we can sit back and 
analyze issues without our attentions or conclusions being 
driven or restrained by the best interests of clients. But law 
professors specializing in copyright law have had limited success 
in persuading either Congress or the courts to make needed 
changes. The problem is not a lack of useful academic writings 
on the subjects within the purview of the Copyright Act. There 
are many brilliant law review articles that make a host of 
sensible normative recommendations, and many legal scholars 
have written trenchant critiques describing misinterpretations 
or misapplications of copyright law. But the practical effect of 
most of this work has generally been quite modest. Judges 
rarely credit legal scholarship with persuasive power on thorny 
analytical questions.18 Copyright treatises are not the only 
reason these articles are so often ignored, but they are surely a 
factor. Courts rely too heavily on copyright treatises when they 
are deciding copyright cases, as evidenced by both their citation 
practices and their substantive legal decisions.19 This is a big 
problem if the treatise consulted is biased or paints inaccurate 
or incomplete pictures of important issues. 
In 2011 Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. suggested 
that there is a disconnect between the legal scholarship 
produced by law professors and the needs and desires of the 
legal profession. He included jurists in his list of practitioners 
who are unlikely to productively engage with law review 
articles, while answering questions at a judicial conference in 
June of 2011, saying: 
 
 18 See Adam Liptak, The Lackluster Review that Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-
lackluster-reviews.html?_r=0; cf. Jack Chin, Getting Law Review Fans Out of the 
Closet: Liptak on Jacobs and Waxman, PRAWFSBLAWG (Oct. 21, 2013, 6:30 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/10/getting-law-review-fans-out-of-the-
closet-liptak-on-jacobs-and-waxman.html; Frank Pasquale, Glass Houses: Liptak on Legal 
Scholarship, BALKINIZATION BLOG (Oct. 22, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/10/glass-houses-liptak-on-legal-scholarship.html. 
 19 Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 
581 (2004). 
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Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is 
likely to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on 
evidentiary approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something, 
which I’m sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, 
but isn’t of much help to the bar . . . . If the academy wants to deal 
with the legal issues at a particularly abstract, philosophical 
level . . . that’s great and that’s their business, but they shouldn’t 
expect that it would be of any particular help or even interest to the 
members of the practice of the bar or judges.20 
University of Maryland law school professor Sherrilyn 
Ifill wrote in reply: 
Legal scholars will on occasion indeed take up Kant (and there’s no 
shame in that), but more often than not, published law review 
articles offer muscular critiques on contemporary legal doctrine, 
alternative approaches to solving complex legal questions, and 
reflect a deep concern with the practical effect of legal decision-
making on how law develops in the courtroom.21 
She correctly noted that there are many law review 
articles that would provide great help to judges, if they would 
read them.22 Ifill said that Roberts apparently intended to  
shame academics with what he regards as our own scholarly 
irrelevance. But the shame is really on the Chief Justice of the 
United States, who demonstrated how out of touch he is with the 
current world of legal scholarship and the potential contribution of 
legal scholars to the work of judges.23 
In October of 2013, journalist-with-a-law-degree Adam 
Liptak24 published an article in the New York Times that 
decried the uselessness of law review articles, citing the 
Roberts quote for support, along with similar words from Second 
Circuit Judge Dennis Jacobs and former Solicitor General Seth 
 
 20 Law Prof. Ifill Challenges Chief Justice Roberts’ Take on Academic 
Scholarship, ACS BLOG (July 5, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/law-prof-ifill-
challenges-chief-justice-roberts%E2%80%99-take-on-academic-scholarship; see also 
Annual Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Conference, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), 
http://www.c-span.org/Events/Annual-Fourth-Circuit-Court-of-Appeals-Conference/
10737422476-1/. 
 21 Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof. Responds After Chief Justice Roberts 
Disses Legal Scholarship, ABA J. (July 7, 2011, 4:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/law_prof_responds_after_chief_justice_roberts_disses_legal_scholarship/; 
Danielle Citron, Sherrilyn Ifill on What the Chief Justice Should Read on Summer Vacation, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 1, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/
archives/2011/07/sherrilyn-ifill-on-what-the-chief-justice-should-read-on-summer-
vacation.html. 
 22 Citron, supra note 21. 
 23 Id.; ACS BLOG, supra note 20. 
 24 Adam Liptak, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/
people/l/adam_liptak/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
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Waxman.25 As law professor Jack Chin trenchantly observed, 
however, both Waxman and Judge Jacobs have actually cited 
law review articles fairly frequently.26 Fellow law professor 
Frank Pasquale additionally noted that a law review article can 
have substantial impact that cannot be measured by judicial 
citations.27 
And yet, really good law review articles on important 
topics can be completely overlooked.28 In my opinion, this is 
especially true with copyright law. Every year significant 
numbers of accessible articles about copyright law are written 
from a wide range of theoretical and practical perspectives, and 
published in a wide variety of periodicals and formats.29 A small 
portion of them are cited by the courts, but this cohort is 
overshadowed by the number of citations to copyright treatises, 
the Nimmer treatise in particular, although the Goldstein and 
Patry treatises also get some attention. Some of these citations 
are to portions of treatises containing straightforward 
descriptions of settled points of law. Other times, a treatise simply 
declares what the law is regardless of where courts have been on 
the matter. Fans of particular copyright treatises have informally 
credited them with being “forward-leaning” or “out ahead of the 
case law.”30 Sometimes, however, a treatise tries to actually 
drive the case law, and sometimes it succeeds. 
II. “LEADING” IS NOT ALWAYS A GOOD QUALITY IN A TREATISE 
As illustrated above, the Copyright Act is complicated, 
often counterintuitive, and frequently amended.31 In an 
institution as august as the Library of Congress, if you have a 
question about copyright law, you might well be directed to 
 
 25 Liptak, supra note 18. 
 26 Chin, supra note 18. 
 27 Pasquale, supra note 18. 
 28 See e.g., Frank Pasquale, Private Prison Problems (and the Scholars Who 
Warned Us), BALKANIZATION BLOG (Oct. 23, 2013, 10:27 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/10/private-prison-problems-and-scholars.html. 
 29 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 740, 740 n.1 (2013) (book review). 
 30 Those are words the author heard used to describe the Nimmer treatise by 
its fans in casual conversation. Cf. Alexandra Goldstein, Nimmer on Copyright 
Celebrates 50 Years, COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE (May 9, 2013), https://copyrightalliance.org/
2013/05/nimmer_copyright_celebrates_50_years#.Umv_anCsgyo. For a more formal 
estimation of a copyright treatise, see generally J. H. Reichman, Goldstein on 
Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN. L. REV. 943 
(1991) (book review). 
 31 Samuelson, supra note 11, at 551-53. 
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consult the Nimmer treatise for an answer.32 Nimmer on 
Copyright, a law librarian there has recently written, “is an 
exhaustive source on all areas of copyright” and “is cited in 
over 3000 federal decisions in the United States and is 
routinely relied on as the authoritative source in copyright 
litigation.”33 According to one account of a recent event held at 
the Library of Congress to celebrate the Nimmer treatise34 
 
 32 Over a decade ago I published an article entitled The Hegemony of the 
Copyright Treatise, in which I warned about the powerful but underappreciated 
influence that the Nimmer copyright treatise has had upon the development of 
copyright law, particularly in the courts. Ann Bartow, supra note 19, at 583. The 
article got a little bit of positive online attention by copyright scholars, and was cited a 
few times by law professors. See INFORMATION, LAW, AND THE LAW OF INFORMATION 
(Jan. 11, 2007), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/01/11/back-to-the-future-of-
copyright-treatises/; Ray Corrigan, Bartow’s Critique of Copyright Treatise Hegemony, 
B2FXXX (Feb. 8, 2005, 6:28 PM), http://b2fxxx.blogspot.com/2005/02/bartows-critique-of-
copyright-treatise.html; The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, COPYFIGHT (Feb. 2, 2005), 
http://copyfight.corante.com/archives/2005/02/02/the_hegemony_of_the_copyright_
treatise.php; William McGeveran, Back to the Future of Copyright Treatises?, INFO/LAW 
(Jan. 11, 2007), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/01/11/back-to-the-future-of-
copyright-treatises/. But in the main, the article was ignored. Everyone continued to 
cite to the Nimmer treatise apace, and judicial citations actually rose even though the 
number of copyright cases resulting in written opinions actually declined. 
  David Nimmer’s only written reaction of which I am aware to the article is 
found within a footnote in his treatise, where he wrote: 
For a further disagreement not only with this treatise but with just about 
every other treatise writer and judge who has ever weighed in on this issue, 
combined with a critique of reliance on any other part of this treatise for good 
measure, see Anne Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 581, 610-40 (2004). Unaccountably, that critic also contends that 
this treatise “does not often cite law professors,” id. at 641, a proposition 
easily refuted by perusal herein. 
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.07[A][3][c] n.32 
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013). Since this footnote appears within the section of the 
treatise entitled “Identification of Joint Authors,” I assume the section of my article 
addressing this issue is what he is referencing, but with an overly broad pinpoint cite 
that should instead list pages 618-28. I do not disagree in the article or as a matter of 
course with Nimmer’s take on the issue, or with “just about every other treatise writer 
and judge who has ever weighed in on this issue.” In addition to spelling my first name 
incorrectly, Nimmer mischaracterizes my discussion of the relevant cases, which is an 
entirely descriptive effort to track the evolution of the jurisprudence on this matter not 
unlike his handling of the various strands of analysis. I expressly take no position on 
the correct interpretive outcome, as evinced rather unambiguously in a parenthetical 
that states “this article takes no position on that issue,” Bartow, supra, note 19, at 623, 
and in fact credit Nimmer’s exposition of the Second Circuit’s position as correct a few 
pages later, id. at 627. 
 33 Jeanine Cali, Nimmer on Copyright, 1st Edition – Pic of the Week, in 
CUSTODIA LEGIS (May 24, 2013), http://blogs.loc.gov/law/2013/05/nimmer-on-copyright-
1st-edition-pic-of-the-week/. 
 34 “Nimmer on Copyright” Now Available as Video Podcast, NEWSNET (July 9, 
2013), http://www.copyright.gov/newsnet/2013/511.html. 
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(which culminated in a Nimmer treatise festschrift in the 
Winter 2013 edition of the Journal of the Copyright Society35):  
Robert Brauneis, who has done significant research on the judicial 
impact of Nimmer on Copyright, detailed the decisions that have 
cited the treatise since its inception. The presentation revealed an 
overwhelming tie between Nimmer’s guide and federal and Supreme 
Court decisions, highlighted by one year in which almost 98% of 
copyright cases cited to Nimmer on Copyright.36 
One academic fan of the Nimmer Treatise recently 
asserted that “As the single most influential treatise in the 
area of copyright law, and one that is routinely referenced by 
courts at all levels, the Nimmer treatise plays an 
underappreciated behind-the-scenes role in facilitating the 
continued development of the common law of copyright among 
courts across the country.”37 The Nimmer treatise’s two major 
competitors are the Goldstein treatise and the Patry treatise. 
Very basic Boolean searches conducted on Westlaw and Lexis 
federal court databases roughly chart the relative impact of 
these three treatises on the judiciary as follows: According to 
Westlaw, the Nimmer treatise has 3,018 citations, the 
Goldstein treatise has 215 and the Patry treatise has 194 
 
 35 See Goldstein, supra note 30 (“And amongst other things, in addition to our 
annual meeting and our mid-winter meeting—the annual meeting [of the Copyright 
Society] is coming up shortly—we publish the Journal of the Copyright Society of the 
USA, and on your way in you got a document that shows the table of contents for our 
next edition, which is a tribute to David and Melville Nimmer’s Nimmer on 
Copyright.”); Cory Field, Melville Nimmer the Writer: A Review of the 1963 First 
Edition of Nimmer on Copyright on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of its 
Publication, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 157, 157 (2013):  
From our present perspective in 2013, Nimmer on Copyright by Melville 
B. Nimmer and David Nimmer has become a monument of legal scholarship: 
eleven volumes cited almost 3,100 times by the courts since it was published 
in 1963. But all enduring monuments must first be carved out of stone, in a 
painstaking process where every chisel stroke must follow the grand design. 
And all legal treatises, no matter how authoritative on the law, must begin 
and end with words. The better the words, the better the law. 
In honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Nimmer on 
Copyright, we return to the original source, the one-volume 1963 first edition 
written by Melville B. Nimmer, to consider how a consummate legal writer 
used words to express himself on the topic of copyright law, and in so doing 
created a style of writing, philosophy of enquiry, and standard of 
uncompromising questioning about the law that still resonates. After fifty 
years, we best honor the work of a legal writer the way we best honor any 
author, by reading his words as they were first offered to the world. 
 36 Goldstein, supra note 30 (emphasis added). 
 37 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Stewarding the Common Law of Copyright, 60 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 103, 104 (2013).  
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citations.38 According to Lexis the Nimmer treatise has 3,189 
citations, the Goldstein treatise has 239 and the Patry treatise 
has 174.39 The Nimmer treatise has been around the longest, 
and is available electronically on the Lexis database. The Patry 
treatise, which was the Latman treatise in a prior iteration, 
and was heavily revised in 2007, is available electronically on 
the Westlaw database.40 The Goldstein treatise does not seem 
to be available electronically other than via CCH, which is 
expensive and rumored to have comparatively few subscribers 
in consequence.41 This has probably negatively affected its use 
and popularity quite dramatically. Because of the overwhelming 
dominance of the Nimmer treatise, it is the primary critical 
focus of this article. 
The publisher of the Nimmer treatise has advertised the 
work in venues like the ABA Law Journal by touting its 
popularity. A sample advertisement states: “When the problem 
is copyright, most attorneys look to one of the texts most 
frequently cited by the courts: NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT. It 
is the only comprehensive treatise that tells you what the law 
says and what it means.”42 
Federal courts have referred to the Nimmer treatise as 
the “leading treatise” on copyright law well over one hundred 
times,43 and even the Supreme Court occasionally cites it in 
lieu of researching a more appropriate citation. For one recent 
and notable example, the Supreme Court opinion in Golan v. 
Holder contains citations to the Nimmer treatise rather than 
the Congressional Record for the proposition that a limited 
retroactivity provision of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement Implementation Act was replaced a year later by 
Congress with the litigated version of 17 U.S.C. § 104A.44 The 
 
 38 Search Results, WESTLAWNEXT, https://1.next.westlaw.com (login; then 
search for “Nimmer w/3 copyright,” “Goldstein w/3 copyright” and “Patry w/3 
copyright”) (last visited June 27, 2013). 
 39 Search Results, LEXIS ADVANCE, https://advance.lexis.com (login; then 
search for “Nimmer w/3 copyright,” “Goldstein w/3 copyright” and “Patry w/3 
copyright”) (last visited June 27, 2013). 
 40 Patry took over the Latman treatise in 1986. See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW (1986). Goldstein began publishing his treatise in 1989. 
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1989). 
 41 Goldstein on Copyright, CCH ONLINE STORE, http://onlinestore.cch.com/
productdetail.asp?productid=3179 (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 42 56 A.B.A. Journal 407, 408 (May 1970) (emphasis in original).  
 43 Search Results, WESTLAWNEXT, https://1.next.westlaw.com (login; then 
search “All Federal” for “Nimmer /35 leading /2 treatise”) (last visited June 27, 2013). 
 44 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 880 n.5 (2012) (citing 3 MELVILLE NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9A.03, 9A.04, pp. 9A-17, 9A-22 (2011)) 
(“NAFTA ultimately included a limited retroactivity provision—a precursor to § 514 of 
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Court also cited the Nimmer treatise to provide support for an 
explanation of the very meaning of restoration in the context of 
this statutory provision,45 again apparently trumping actual 
legislative history in authority. 
One can find examples of the Nimmer treatise serving 
as proxy for legislative history throughout the Supreme Court’s 
copyright jurisprudence. Back in 1985, in Harper & Row v. The 
Nation, which is deeply unfavorable to both copyright’s fair use 
doctrine and the First Amendment’s free speech clause, Justice 
O’Connor cited the treatise to support the proposition that “the 
statutory formulation of the defense of fair use in the Copyright 
Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common law 
doctrine.”46 She went on to rely upon the Nimmer treatise for the 
explosive contention47 that “it has never been seriously disputed 
that ‘the fact that the plaintiff ’s work is unpublished . . . is a 
factor tending to negate the defense of fair use,’”48 and the 
treatise’s assertion that “the fact that a work is unpublished is a 
critical element of its ‘nature’ in crafting the Court’s majority 
opinion.”49 As events transpired, however, Congress itself 
disputed the concept of the unpublished nature of a work 
negating fair use quite vociferously in the wake of the Harper & 
Row decision by adding to Section 107 of the Copyright Act the 
                                                                                                                       
the URAA—granting U.S. copyright protection to certain Mexican and Canadian films. 
These films had fallen into the public domain between 1978 and 1988 for failure to 
meet U.S. notice requirements. One year later, Congress replaced this provision with 
the version of 17 U.S.C. § 104A at issue here.” (citations omitted)). 
 45 Id. at 882 n.13 (citing 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 44 
§ 9A.04[A][1][b][iii], at 9A-26 & n.29.4) (“Restoration is a misnomer insofar as it implies that 
all works protected under § 104A previously enjoyed protection. Each work in the public 
domain because of lack of national eligibility or subject-matter protection, and many that 
failed to comply with formalities, never enjoyed U.S. copyright protection.”). 
 46 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). 
 47 See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1674-75 (1988); Gary L. Francione, Facing The Nation: The 
Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. 
REV. 519, 533 (1986); W. Warren Hamel, Harper & Row v. The Nation: A First 
Amendment Privilege for News Reporting of Copyrightable Material?, 19 COLUM. J. L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 253, 301-02 n.268 (1985); Owen B. Cooper, Note, Fair Use of Copyrighted 
Work Under Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 61 TUL. L. REV. 415, 
422 (1986); Stacy Daniels, Note, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises: 
Pirating Unpublished Copyrighted Works: Does the Fair Use Doctrine Vindicate First 
Amendment Rights?, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 501, 509 (1986); Robin Feingold, Note, 
When “Fair is Foul”: A Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 218, 232-37 (1986); Greg A. 
Perry, Note, Copyright and the First Amendment: Nurturing the Seeds for Harvest, 65 
NEB. L. REV. 631, 648-49 (1986); Timothy V. Phelps, Note, Copyright: The Public Figure 
Expansion of the Fair Use Doctrine Rejected, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 385, 392-93 (1986); The 
Supreme Court, 1984 Term—Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 294-95 (1985). 
 48 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551. 
 49 Id. at 564. 
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phrase: “The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar 
a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration 
of all the above factors.”50 
It was also in Harper & Row that the Supreme Court 
quoted and adopted the Nimmer treatise’s admonition that the 
final factor of Section 107’s four-part fair use test,51 “the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work” was “undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use.”52 This was a deeply problematic contention 
because it suggests that any use that potentially affects the 
market or value of a copyrighted work cannot be a fair one, 
severely compressing the doctrine.53 The Court later fixed this 
Nimmer-influenced mistake itself, in its most important 
nonliteral copying fair use case, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, dialing 
back the importance of commercial use in a fair use evaluation.54 
 
 50 The Copyright Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102–492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992) (as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012)); see generally Daniel E. Wanat, Fair Use and the 1992 
Amendment to Section 107 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 1 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.F. 47 (1994). 
 51 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a 
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if 
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
 52 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 (citing 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra 
note 44, § 13.05[A], at 13-76) (“Finally, the Act focuses on ‘the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.’ This last factor is undoubtedly 
the single most important element of fair use.”). 
 53 Wendy J. Gordon & Daniel Bahls, The Public’s Right to Fair Use: 
Amending Section 107 to Avoid the “Fared Use” Fallacy, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 619, 657; 
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of 
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTEL. PROP. L. 1, 6-7 (1997); cf. Wendy J. Gordon, 
Fair Use Markets: On Weighing Potential License Fees, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1814 
(2011); but see Ashten Kimbrough, Note, Transformative Use vs. Market Impact: Why 
the Fourth Fair Use Factor Should Not Be Supplanted by Transformative Use as the 
Most Important Element in a Fair Use Analysis, 63 ALA. L. REV. 625, 627 (2012). 
 54 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
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Ironically, it perhaps obliviously cited the Nimmer treatise while 
doing so, though of course to a section other than the fourth factor 
“single most important element” analysis the Court rejected.55 
The current version of the Nimmer treatise still doggedly 
maintains with respect to the fourth factor: “If one looks to the 
fair use cases, if not always to their stated rationale, this emerges 
as the most important, and indeed, central fair use factor.”56 
Ironically, in his capacity as an attorney, treatise 
founder Melville Nimmer filed an amicus brief in Harper & 
Row v. Nation Enterprises on behalf of Gannett, a large media 
company, urging affirmance by the Supreme Court of the 
Second Circuit’s decision that what the Nation did was fair use. 
Attorney Nimmer’s amicus brief was apparently inadequately 
persuasive. Instead the majority reversed, with Justice 
O’Connor citing or referencing the Nimmer treatise 20 times in 
her opinion. The dissent by Justice Brennan cited or referenced 
the Nimmer treatise an additional six times. Reading through 
both with a precise focus on the Nimmer treatise citations and 
references creates a powerful impression that no matter what 
statement one wanted to make about fair use, one can find 
support for that contention in the Nimmer treatise. Perusal of 
the current version of the treatise does nothing to disabuse one 
of that notion. Seemingly any position on a fair use question is 
susceptible to a Nimmer citation. Whether this is a strength or a 
weakness of this section of the work is in the eye of the beholder. 
At times it can appear as if a Justice cites to the 
Nimmer treatise by rote, as if it is a necessary, check-the-box 
sort of exercise even when the treatise adds little of substance 
to a topic. In the recent Supreme Court case Kirtsaeng v. John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc.,57 both the majority and dissenting opinions 
cite to the Nimmer treatise on the extraterritorial operation of 
copyright law with absolutely zero utility in terms of 
diagnostically framing the issue. The case involved a dispute 
about inexpensive foreign-made textbooks, which third parties 
were importing into the United States and selling on eBay for 
 
 55 Id. at 590 (citing 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 44, § 13.05[A] [4], 
p. 13-102.61.) (“The fourth fair use factor is ‘the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.’ § 107(4). It requires courts to consider not 
only the extent of market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged 
infringer, but also ‘whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in 
by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 
market’ for the original.” (citations omitted)). 
 56 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.05[A][4] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2013) (citations omitted). 
 57 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). 
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huge profits despite the objections of copyright-holding 
publishers. The Court held that if a copy was made legally, 
lawfully acquired abroad, and then imported into the United 
States, it could be resold within the United States without the 
copyright owner’s permission because there is no geographic 
restriction on Section 109’s “first sale” doctrine.58 The majority 
opinion penned by Justice Breyer textually cites to the Nimmer 
treatise with a cf. signifier, laying down a choppy parenthetical 
crediting the tome with: “noting that the principle that ‘copyright 
laws do not have any extraterritorial operation’ ‘requires some 
qualification.’”59 Why he even bothered is hard to fathom. 
The ardent dissent written by Justice Ginsburg 
embraces the first contention only, citing the identical section 
of the Nimmer treatise for the parenthetical proposition that 
“[C]opyright laws do not have any extraterritorial operation.”60 
But that was not the only time Justice Ginsburg invoked the 
treatise, and the Kirtsaeng dissent ultimately cited all three of the 
mentioned copyright treatises, noting at one impassioned analytic 
juncture: “It is unsurprising that none of the three major treatises 
on U.S. copyright law embrace the Court’s construction of 
§ 109(a).”61 Her Nimmer citations make a bit more sense, at least 
to the extent that not ruling in a way that is consistent with 
copyright treatises implies that the Court is in error. 
One commentator has observed that “Nimmer never 
misses an opportunity to exhibit leadership, to set forth his 
view of how the law should proceed in future cases, inviting 
judges to follow his lead.”62 In lower court opinions, one can find 
contextual citations which suggest that judges can place too 
much weight on the prescriptions of the Nimmer treatise, and 
fail to engage in enough independent analysis. For example, in 
Silvers v. Sony a district court judge adopted a very expansive 
view of standing primarily because the Nimmer treatise told 
him to, writing: 
To support its claim of standing, Plaintiff relies principally on 
Nimmer on Copyright. Nimmer opines that “the assignee of an 
accrued infringement cause of action has standing to sue without the 
 
 58 Id. at 1358. 
 59 Id. at 1359-60. 
 60 Id. at 1376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 61 Id. at 1391 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 2 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12[B][6][c], at 8–184.34 to 8–184.35; 2 Goldstein 
§ 7.6.1.2(a), at 7:141; 4 Patry §§ 13:22, 13:44, 13:44.10). 
 62 Corey Field, Melville Nimmer the Writer: A Review of the 1963 First 
Edition of Nimmer On Copyright on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of its 
Publication, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 157, 162 (2013). 
474 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
need to join his assignor, even if the latter retains ownership of all 
other rights under the copyright.” Nimmer § 12.02[B]. In support of 
that proposition, the treatise cites Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 
410 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1969).  
Prather appears to support Plaintiff ’ s position. The Fifth Circuit 
seemed to suggest that a plaintiff could have standing to sue, even if 
the plaintiff were not a copyright holder or exclusive licensee, based 
simply on an assignment of an accrued cause of action. The court 
stated: “overlooked by all counsel is the effectiveness of an 
assignment of accrued causes of action for copyright infringement.” 
410 F.2d at 700. This statement is dictum, however, because the 
plaintiff in Prather was assigned both the accrued causes of action 
and the copyright rights. The Fifth Circuit’s decision thus does not 
answer whether the assignment of the cause of action alone is 
sufficient to confer standing. 
That being said, the Court is nevertheless persuaded that Plaintiff 
has standing to pursue the copyright claim in this case. Various facts 
influence the Court’s decision. First, the leading treatise on the 
subject, Nimmer on Copyright, a source frequently cited by the 
Supreme Court as authority on copyright law, rejects Eden Toys and 
opines that the assignment of an accrued cause of action is effective to 
confer standing on the assignee, even though the assignor retains all 
interests in the copyright.63 
So the first reason proffered for the ruling is that it is in 
accord with the dictates of Nimmer! Although the judge 
astutely noticed that the Nimmer treatise did not support its 
own positivist declaration of law with actual substantiating 
holdings, he seemed to rule for the Plaintiff primarily based on 
what the Nimmer treatise said the law should be, which among 
other things offered a secure doctrinal position for entities 
popularly referred to as “copyright trolls.”64 Copyright trolls are 
entities whose business model is using mass copyright litigation 
to extract quick settlements from individual defendants who want 
to avoid the costs and possible embarrassment of protracted 
litigation.65 Given that it proffered no supporting case law, the 
Nimmer treatise was perhaps signaling to readers that this was 
speculation rather than settled law, but also that this was what the 
law should be. Ultimately an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit 
disagreed with both the district court judge and the suggestions of 
 
 63 Order Granting In Part And Denying In Part Defendant’s Motion To 
Dismiss, Silvers v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., No. CV 00-6386 SVW (RCx), 2001 WL 
36127624, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2001) (emphasis added). 
 64 Copyright Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/
issues/copyright-trolls (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 65 For further discussion, see Copyright Troll Stories, TECHDIRT, 
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/?tag=copyright+troll (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
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Nimmer treatise on this issue.66 That opinion became the basis for 
the Ninth Circuit’s recent rejection of the claim in Righthaven, LLC 
v. Hoehn that Righthaven had standing to sue for copyright 
infringement without holding any ownership interest in the 
copyright, simply on the basis of agreements granting it the bare 
right to sue for infringement.67 Many copyright troll leery 
commentators were quite relieved by this outcome.68 
A. Questioning Authorities 
While bringing passion to one’s work is admirable, 
sometimes treatise writers may get a little too wrapped up in 
their work, to the detriment of the tome’s perceived balance or 
neutrality. For example, consider the somewhat melodramatic 
tone that pervades the “Identification of Joint Authors” section 
of the Nimmer treatise.69 The Copyright Act defines a “joint 
work” as “a work prepared by two or more authors with the 
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable 
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”70 In laying out the 
requirements for qualifying as a co-author for joint authorship 
purposes, the Nimmer treatise states that “A large volume of 
exegesis arises here.”71 Nimmer asserts that the contribution to 
the finished work must be “more than de minimis” and one of 
 
 66 Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), 
reversing No. CV 00-6386 SVW (RCx), 2001 WL 36127626 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2001). 
 67 Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 716 F.3d 1166, 1169-71 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 68 Michael P. Boudett, Another Blo Is Struck Against Monetization of Copyright 
Enforcement Claims, MONDAQ (June 3, 2013), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
x/242692/Copyright/Another+Blow+Is+Struck+Against+Monetization+Of+Copyright+
Enforcement+Claims+Trademark+And+Copyright+Law; Eric Goldman, Copyright Trolling 
Is Really Hard to Do Profitably—Righthaven v. Hoehn, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (May 9, 
2013), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/05/copyright_troll.htm; Devlin Hartline, A 
Closer Look at the Righthaven Standing Issue, COPYHYPE (Mar. 26, 2013), 
http://www.copyhype.com/2013/03/a-closer-look-at-the-righthaven-standing-issue-4/; David 
Lat, Benchslap of the Day: Ninth Circuit Smacks Copyright Trolls, ABOVE THE LAW (May 9, 
2013, 4:08 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/05/benchslap-of-the-day-ninth-circuit-smacks-
copyright-trolls/; Mike Masnick, Righthaven Copyrights ‘Sold’ Back to Stephens Media for 
$80k to Pay Legal Fees, TECHDIRT (Mar. 18, 2013, 7:39 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20130316/02363422348/righthaven-copyrights-sold-back-to-stephens-media-80k-to-
pay-legal-fees.shtml; Cy Ryan, Appeals Court Rules That Righthaven Lacked Standing To 
Sue Over Copyrights, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 19, 2013, 5:13 PM), available at 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2013/may/09/appeals-court-rules-righthaven-lacked-
standing-sue/; cf. Assignment to Sue for Copyright Not Enough for Standing – Appeals 
Court, LEGAL MONITOR WORLDWIDE (May 10, 2013), https://1.next.westlaw.com (sign in; 
then search “2013 WLNR 11547754”); Copyright Assertion Entities Must Have the 
Exclusive. . ., WASH. INTERNET DAILY (May 13, 2013), https://1.next.westlaw.com (sign in; 
then search “2013 WLNR 11960933”). 
 69 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 6.07. 
 70 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 71 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 6.07 [A]. 
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authorship, but that it “need not itself be separately 
copyrightable.”72 It is on this third point that the emotion invested 
in his preferred interpretation becomes apparent. First, Nimmer 
observes that “[t]he most contentious issue in this domain 
revolves around whether A and B must each contribute material 
that, standing alone, would be separately copyrightable in order 
to style them joint authors. As we shall see, uncertainty and 
disagreement punctuate these issues.”73 Then, Nimmer explains 
that no requirement for a separately copyrightable contribution 
can be found within the text of the Copyright Act or its 
legislative history, writing: 
That language contains no requirement that each contribute an 
independently copyrightable component to the product. The 
legislative history similarly elevates intention as the touchstone, 
without placing any further parsing as to the copyrightable status of 
each individual component that the parties intend to contribute to 
the work as a whole.74 
Next, he makes a policy pitch, stating that: 
It is submitted that copyright’s goal of fostering creativity is best 
served, particularly in the motion picture context, by rewarding all 
parties who labor together to unite idea with form, and that 
copyright protection should extend both to the contributor of the 
skeletal ideas and the contributor who fleshes out the project.75 
Finally, there are words of self-congratulatory glee, 
crowing that on the putatively “solitary” issue of copyright law 
that courts had strayed from treatise dictates on, there had 
been a positive development: 
The thrust of the decisions summarized above seemed clear enough 
by the start of 2004 to lead to this writer’s concession that on this 
solitary issue alone, among the myriad propositions advanced 
throughout these many volumes, the courts had soundly rejected the 
instant treatise’s point of view. But news of the death of the idea-
contributor-as-joint-author doctrine proved to be greatly 
exaggerated. For no sooner did that concession appear in print than 
the Seventh Circuit described this treatise’s point of view as 
“heretical”—and then proceeded to choose it!76 
Evidence about the intentions of the people involved at 
the time a potentially joint work is produced can be crucial to 
 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. § 6.07 [A][3] (emphasis added). 
 74 Id. § 6.07 [A][3][a]. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. § 6.07 [A][3][c].  
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joint authorship determinations. But when intention evidence 
is conflicted or lacking, some judges seem to feel more confident 
ruling against a putative joint author on the basis that an 
“independently copyrightable contribution” has not been made.77 
What’s most interesting to me about all this is that plaintiffs 
asserting joint authorship through litigation almost never 
prevail,78 as courts seem extremely nervous about making it too 
easy for someone to sue herself into joint authorship status with 
respect to a commercially successful work. What seems to be most 
interesting to David Nimmer, however, is whether judges will 
capitulate to the treatise and follow his dictates in this matter. 
He describes opposing points of view as “resistance,”79 and 
courts that disagree with his analysis as “applying the 
rejectionist view.”80 He further informs the reader that “[o]ne 
court acknowledged that applying the rejectionist view may 
have produced what might be considered an unjust result.”81 
Then, because the Seventh Circuit agreed with him in one 
instance, the treatise subsection following “Resistance” is 
entitled “Vindication,” and is comprised of a lengthy explication 
of the case and why “now that the camel’s nose is under the 
tent, it is ripe to re-examine the rejectionist point of view.”82 
Consider another example of Nimmer explicitly trying 
to mold the law. Law Professor Christopher Newman recently 
noted that over a decade of commentary on a case concerned 
with copyright assignments and licenses, Gardner v. Nike,83 
“has been uniformly and vociferously critical” and that 
“Gardner’s critics assert—with no little vehemence—that the 
holding blatantly contradicts the statutory text and legislative 
history, and that it runs counter to the policy of copyright 
 
 77 See NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTION COMMITTEE, NINTH CIRCUIT 
MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL 374-75 (2007), available at 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/264; Abbott M. Jones, Note, Yours, 
Mine, and Ours: The Joint Authorship Conundrum for Sound Recordings, 10 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 13, 16-17 (2008); Sources for Joint Authorship Module, CYBER L. 
HARV., http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/joint/sources.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2013) (listing articles and cases). 
 78 See e.g., Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1227 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 500 (2d Cir. 1991); Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 
195 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 79 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 6.07 [A][3][b]. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. § 6.07[A][3][b] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id. § 6.07 [A][3][c]. 
 83 Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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divisibility adopted in the 1976 Act.”84 This impassioned 
criticism came not only from interested parties, but is found 
within the pages of the Nimmer and Patry treatises as well.85 
Patry calls it “one of the most baffling copyright opinions ever,” 
while Nimmer, ever the activist, calls for the case not to be 
followed altogether.86 Again, an example of Nimmer advocating 
for changes in the law rather than simply explaining it. 
Of course David Nimmer has every right to opine within 
the pages of his own treatise any way he likes. Treatise readers 
simply need to remain cognizant of the fact that the same urge 
to win arguments that moves lawyers in practice and law 
professors within the pages of law review articles like this can 
also animate and energize treatise writers, and they can get 
overinvested in victory. Additionally, they may parlay their 
association with a treatise into lucrative work as expert 
witnesses, with mixed success.87 
 
 84 Christopher M. Newman, An Exclusive License Is Not an Assignment: 
Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in Copyright, 74 LA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2286833. 
 85 See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 44, § 10.02 [B][4][b] (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed. 2013) (criticizing Gardner and suggesting that it “should not be 
followed”); 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:103 (2013) (calling it “one of 
the most baffling copyright opinions ever” and “decision making run amok”). 
 86 Newman, supra note 84. 
 87 Treatise readers also need to carefully consider how much depth or 
gravitas a treatise author brings to any particular issue. In a copyright dispute over 
the television series “My Name is Earl,” David Nimmer was excluded as an expert 
witness by Judge Wilson of the Central District of California, who wrote: 
Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Nimmer is qualified to render an 
expert opinion on the issue of substantial similarity between two literary 
works. Nimmer’s experience, training, and education establish that Nimmer 
undoubtedly is an expert in the field of copyright law. He is a graduate of 
Yale Law School, and a partner at the Los Angeles-based firm of Irell & 
Manella. He specializes in and teaches copyright law and is the current 
author of the preeminent copyright treatise Nimmer on Copyright, which is 
often cited by appellate courts, including the Supreme Court. Over the past 
three decades, Nimmer has published numerous books and dozens of articles 
on copyright law, spoken at many copyright law conferences, and taught 
seminars to federal judges on the issue of substantial similarity in copyright 
law. Given this extensive background, there can be no question that Nimmer 
is well-qualified to perform a legal analysis regarding copyright claims. 
However, as discussed below, an expert cannot offer his legal opinion as to 
whether a triable issue of fact exists regarding copyright infringement; such 
an analysis is the exclusive province of the Court. 
Instead, the relevant issue on summary judgment, and indeed the subject 
matter upon which Nimmer seeks to opine, is whether there is substantial 
similarity in the objective elements of theme, plot, dialogue, characters, 
sequence of events, mood, pace, and setting between Karma! and Earl. In 
short, Nimmer was tasked with performing a literary analysis of two fiction 
works. However, Nimmer offers little explanation as to how his legal 
expertise qualifies him to compare a screenplay and a television series on the 
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Every copyright treatise is filled with legal conclusions. 
Some of them are well supported by case law, while others may 
not be. And some of them may be written with a hidden, or at 
least obfuscated, agenda, as when a treatise writer is 
                                                                                                                       
eight criteria mentioned. Notably absent from Nimmer’s report and 
declarations is any indication that Nimmer has experience, knowledge, 
training, or education in the literary field—for example, there is no evidence 
that Nimmer has ever worked as a film critic, a publisher, an English 
professor, an editor or director, that Nimmer writes fiction works, or even 
that Nimmer is an avid movie buff or television-watcher. While the Court 
recognizes that the task of comparing two fiction works is not highly 
technical, and indeed requires no specific training, to offer an expert literary 
analysis there must be some indication that Nimmer has, in one capacity or 
another, watched, read, written, compared and/or analyzed literary works. 
No such evidence exists here. 
Further, Nimmer’s prior experience as an expert witness or consultant, with 
perhaps one or two exceptions, is not relevant to the literary analysis offered 
in this case. Nimmer lists several cases in which he previously offered expert 
testimony regarding the substantial similarity of works such as technical 
drawings, architectural plans, bingo cards, instructions for the use of 
pesticides, and computer software. Nimmer does not explain the specific 
analysis he performed; however, his assignments in those cases did not 
involve fiction works such as television shows, plays, movies, or books. Thus, 
this prior experience does not inform the literary analysis offered here. There 
are two instances in which Nimmer may have performed a similar analysis 
as that offered here, although given the vague descriptions of these 
assignments, it is difficult to know for certain. First, Nimmer declares that he 
assisted a publisher in overturning an injunction in a copyright case 
involving a comparison between Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind and 
Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone. But Nimmer fails to describe the issue 
that he was asked to analyze or the opinion he ultimately rendered in that 
case. Nimmer also notes one assignment, in Time Warner Entertainment Co. 
v. Continental Casualty Co., Case No. 02-01885 R (C.D. Cal.), where he was 
asked to compare a revised screenplay with the motion picture Contact and 
concluded that the unlicensed, protectable expression from the screenplay 
that was used in the film gave rise to a valid copyright claim. While this prior 
experience appears relevant, the fact that Nimmer testified as an expert once 
before in a case involving literary works is not a sufficient basis, without 
more, to accept his testimony here. 
In sum, Nimmer’s specialized knowledge of copyright law and his legal expertise 
does not qualify him as a literary expert. . . . As such, Nimmer’s opinions as to the 
points of similarity between Karma! and Earl are not admissible. 
Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 833-35 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (footnotes 
omitted) (citations omitted). On appeal the Ninth Circuit panel did not view this as an 
abuse of discretion, writing in an unpublished opinion: 
The district court also did not err in excluding expert testimony from David 
Nimmer and Eric Sherman. Some of Nimmer’s testimony contained 
inadmissible legal conclusions. According to the district court, although each 
were recognized to have a separate area of expertise, both Nimmer and 
Sherman also failed to establish that they had “knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education” relevant to the evidence at issue. Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
Gable v. Nat’l Broad Co., 438 F. App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2011) (footnotes omitted) (citations 
omitted). 
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attempting to change the law without clearly informing the 
reader of this mission. 
B. Advocacy Versus Accuracy 
Media companies engage in a lot of Congressional 
lobbying to influence the crafting of statutory provisions that 
affect them. They also drive much of the high cost and high 
impact copyright litigation in the United States. To the extent 
that a copyright treatise functions as a source of copyright law 
rather than simply a description of it, the addition or revision 
of a treatise section in a way that was generally favorable to 
media companies could function a bit like lobbying Congress in 
terms of influencing the future development of pertinent 
provisions of the law. Below are a few examples of the impact a 
treatise can have upon copyright law writ large. 
1. Termination Rights 
Copyright termination rights give some authors an 
opportunity to regain ownership of their copyrights many years 
after they licensed them away.88 The Nimmer treatise contains 
a lengthy attack89 upon Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit 
opinions on copyright termination rights90 that interpret 
language in the Copyright Act making these termination rights 
non-waivable in a manner he strongly disagrees with. Here is 
just a short excerpt: 
The formulation “[t]ermination of the grant may be effected 
notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary” plainly means that 
authors and their successors may terminate copyright assignments 
in spite of any contractual device that purports to divest them of the 
right; the express legislative intent was to override Fisher by 
guaranteeing that authors and their successors have the opportunity 
to regain copyright “notwithstanding any agreement to the 
contrary.” 
The Supreme Court has remarked that such termination of transfer 
rights is “inalienable.” Yet Milne and Steinbeck effectively held that 
statutory successors’ termination rights are alienated when the 
copyright owner renegotiates an existing grant. Those decisions not 
only harm the statutory successors of innumerable copyrights, but 
also undermine Congress’s intention of shielding authors from the 
 
 88 Brian D. Caplan, Navigating U.S. Copyright Termination Rights, WIPO 
MAG. (Aug. 2012), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2012/04/article_0005.html. 
 89 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 44, § 11.07 [C]–[D]. 
 90 Caplan & Ross, supra note 9, at 14. 
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pressures of unequal bargaining power that had produced 
unremunerative transfers in the creative arts. At base, they 
substitute a subjective judicial balancing rule for a clear, 
legislatively established, categorical rule.  
The question at hand is not whether the legislative determination 
constraining freedom of contract was the best policy for addressing 
the problem of unremunerative transfers in the realm of copyrighted 
works. Given that Congress already chose that policy, the instant 
critique is that Milne and Steinbeck overstep judicial authority 
within our constitutional structure. 
Those rulings implicate numerous valuable copyrights, as all 
copyrights that are not works-made-for-hire are subject to 
termination. Furthermore, although those rulings construed the 
section of the Copyright Act governing the right to terminate grants 
in works that achieved protection before 1978 (§ 304(c)), the 
coordinate provision of the Copyright Act governing the right to 
terminate post-1978 grants (§ 203) includes the identical provision 
that “[t]ermination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any 
agreement to the contrary . . . .” Therefore, when grants in post-1978 
works become terminable beginning in 2013, courts can be expected 
to rely on Milne and Steinbeck to determine whether an author has 
the right to terminate. Unfortunately, authors and their successors 
can expect protracted courtroom battles when they attempt to 
enforce their statutorily mandated recapture rights.91  
There are several possible explanations for the extended 
critique of the courts here. Maybe Nimmer simply has strong 
personal feelings about the issue. Or maybe this is because his 
preexisting treatise analysis was explicitly parsed and rejected 
by the Second Circuit in the Steinbeck case he rails against.92 
Or, it may be because he was the losing attorney in the Ninth 
Circuit “Pooh Properties” Milne case that he criticizes so 
harshly.93 Possibly all three of these factors had an impact. 
Additionally, (as with Steinbeck) the Ninth Circuit opinion in 
Milne was expressly critical of the Nimmer treatise, holding: 
Clare’s sole support for her position is found in a treatise authored 
by the late-Professor Melville Nimmer. In his treatise, Professor 
Nimmer expressed his assumption that this subsection—which on its 
face applies only to the statutory termination of a prior copyright  
 91 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 44, § 11.07 [D][1]. 
 92 Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“We also reject the suggestion that, notwithstanding the plain language of the 1994 
Agreement, there was no effective termination of the 1938 Agreement because the 1994 
Agreement provided no opportunity—no ‘moment of freedom’—for those holding the 
termination right to renegotiate the terms of the grant. Appellees draw support for this 
theory primarily from Nimmer on Copyright § 11.07 (6th ed. 1978), referring to 17 
U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(D).”). 
 93 Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1037, 1048 
(9th Cir. 2005). 
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grant—is intended to benefit authors and should therefore be 
extended to prohibit a simultaneous contractual termination and re-
grant of copyright rights. See 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 11.07(6th ed.1978). Clare’s counsel, however, conceded at oral 
argument that no source of primary authority has endorsed this 
assumption. We too decline to do so.94 
I personally think that Nimmer’s treatise-described 
approach best effectuates the policy goals of terminations 
rights, and in consequence his reading of the statute is 
justifiable and correct. But the Nimmer approach failed big when 
it was field tested. A better approach for a treatise writer would 
be to openly disclose and discuss his personal involvement in 
litigating one of the cases, and then simply recount the 
approaches that courts have taken in these cases and offer a 
measured critique that the reader would understand represented 
the editor’s informed opinion and hopes for the future. For 
example, the Patry treatise’s coverage of the Milne case is very 
detailed but also quite straightforward, containing 
observations such as: 
The critical question is whether, on the facts presented, the 1983 
agreement was a permissible revocation of the 1930 agreement, or was 
instead a disguised “agreement to the contrary.” As a general principle, 
section 304(c)(5) does not purport to prohibit parties from amending or 
replacing pre-1978 agreements, nor does that section prohibit all 
contractual activity, only agreements that purport to waive terminate 
rights. The nature of the 1983 agreement was ultimately a question of 
fact, and here the court’s familiarity with those facts and the parties’ 
conduct justifies its conclusion, if not its reasoning.95 
Thus, Patry calmly explains what the court did, and 
gives a lucid explanation for why it reached a result that might 
not have been well reasoned, forgoing florid comments such as: 
“Given how fervently Congress tried in 1976 to eliminate the 
baleful consequences of Fisher, it is terribly unfortunate that 
courts are again falling into the same trap.”96 Whether 
Nimmer’s own intense fervence will release courts back into 
the wild unharmed remains to be seen. 
2. Fact v. Law in Fair Use 
It is also interesting to note that David Nimmer has 
materially changed one portion of the treatise concerning fair 
 
 94 Id. at 1047 (emphasis in original). 
 95 3 PATRY, supra note 85, § 7:46. 
 96 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 44, § 11.07 [D][2]. 
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use on summary judgment whilst characterizing his father 
Melville’s position as old, and his own as “the modern view,”97 
which perhaps is more polite than simply declaring himself 
correct. In my view the issue continues to lack a clear answer. 
Melville Nimmer argued against analyzing fair use on summary 
judgment,98 much less as a pure matter of law.99 He held the view 
that fact findings were necessary to appropriately ascertain 
whether a contested non-permissive use of a work was fair. The 
current version of the Nimmer treatise states: “[T]he older view is 
that the issue whether similarity between two works is fair use 
presented a triable issue of fact. Under the modern view . . . the 
court may resolve the fair use defense as a matter of law on 
summary judgment.”100 Though correctly noting a change in the 
jurisprudence, the treatise treats the matter as black letter 
law, when in fact the law is unsettled. Some courts treat the 
inferences in the four-factor analysis as triable issues of fact for 
a jury,101 while other courts examine the inferences as pure 
matters of law.102 
3. Making Available 
The Nimmer treatise has also reversed its position on 
the “making available” right.103 David Nimmer’s explanation for 
the change is that he was persuaded by the scholarship of law 
 
 97 See 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 44, § 12.10 [B][4] & n.115. 
 98 For a lengthy discussion of the issue, see Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: 
Constitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 483 (2010). 
 99 See Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Professor 
Nimmer, in his treatise on the law of copyright, suggests that the issue of ‘fair use’ 
presents questions of fact and thus should not be determined on a motion for summary 
judgment. MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER on Copyright § 138, at 600 (1969).”). 
 100 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER supra note 44, § 12.10[B][4], at 12-193 & n.115.  
 101 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome, Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 411 
(5th Cir. 2004) (“The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, when viewed through the lens of the statutory fair use factors, support the 
jury’s fair use finding.”); Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“Summary judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because 
courts have been reluctant to make subjective determinations . . . .”). 
 102 See, e.g., Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 
267, 272-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that fair use “is ordinarily a factual question for 
the jury to determine” and then justifying its summary judgment treatment on grounds 
that the historical facts enabled the judge to engage in four-factor analysis—implying 
that the inferences in the four-factor analysis are pure issues of law). Profound thanks 
to Ned Snow for this observation and the supporting citations in this and the preceding 
footnote; see also, Snow, supra note 98. 
 103 INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., THE WIPO TREATIES: ‘MAKING 
AVAILABLE’ RIGHT (March 2003), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/wipo-
treaties-making-available-right.pdf. 
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professor Peter Menell.104 To prove a violation of the 
distribution right, most (though certainly not all) courts have 
held that a copyright owner needs to show an actual act of 
distribution of its content has taken place.105 Content owners 
prefer that a simple offer to distribute that content suffice, so 
that “making available” is itself a violation and no proof that 
anyone took advantage of this opportunity is required.106 
The distinction is of profound importance in the online 
context, where under the first view simply posting something 
to a website without authorization is not an infringement 
unless someone actually downloads it,107 but simply making the 
content available for potential downloading is an automatic 
infringement under the second view.108 As recently as 2011,109 
 
 104 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 32 § 8.11 and accompanying footnotes; see also 
Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the Right to Distribute 
in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 20 n.90 (2011) (“The discussion 
that follows is based upon the version of Nimmer on Copyright that was available to 
jurists and practitioners through August 2011. After reading this article, Professor 
Nimmer asked me to co-author a complete revision of the sections of Nimmer on 
Copyright relating to the scope of the distribution right and the definition of 
‘publication.’”); Rick Sanders, Is Nimmer & Menell’s “Lost Ark” of Copyright Just a 
Prop?, AARON SANDERS PLLC (May 30, 2013), http://www.aaronsanderslaw.com/blog/is-
nimmer-menells-lost-ark-of-copyright-just-a-prop. 
 105 Does the Copyright Act Encompass a Making Available Right, COPYRIGHT 
& TRADEMARK BLOG (Aug. 29, 2011), http://copymarkblog.com/2011/08/29/does-the-
copyright-act-encompass-a-making-available-right/; Rick Sanders, Will Professor 
Nimmer’s Change of Heart on File Sharing Matter, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 857 
(2013), available at http://www.jetlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Sanders.pdf; 
John Horsfield-Bradbury, “Making Available” as Distribution: File-Sharing and the 
Copyright Act, 22 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 273 (2008). 
 106 Rick Sanders, Is Nimmer & Menell’s “Lost Ark” of Copyright Just a Prop?, 
AARON SANDERS PLLC (May 30, 2013), http://www.aaronsanderslaw.com/blog/is-
nimmer-menells-lost-ark-of-copyright-just-a-prop. 
 107 Sanders, supra note 105; Horsfield-Bradbury, supra note 105. 
 108 Sanders, supra note 105. In his copyright blog William Patry noted that  
[i]n a routine suit against downloading via KaZaA, and in an opinion that 
focused almost entirely on the consequences of spoilation of evidence, Judge 
Cynthia Rufe of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Motown Records Co. 
v. Theresa DePietro, Civ. No. 04-CV-2246 (Feb. 16, 2007)(HT to Paul Fakler), 
tossed off these remarks (p. 7): 
A plaintiff claiming infringement of the exclusive-distribution right 
can establish infringement by proof of actual distribution or by 
proof of offers to distribute, that is proof that the defendant “made 
available” the copyrighted work. While neither the United States 
Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has confirmed a copyright 
holder’s exclusive right to make the work available, the Court is 
convinced that 17 U.S.C. § 106 encompasses such a right based on 
its reading of the statute, the important decision in A&M Records, 
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Circuit 2001), and the 
opinion offered by the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, in a 
letter to Congressional hearings on piracy of intellectual property 
on peer-to-peer networks, Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of 
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the Nimmer treatise said that making a work available was 
insufficient to establish distribution.110 Now it says the 
reverse.111 This change dramatically drives this aspect of 
copyright law in a direction that benefits large content owners 
such as music and movie companies. 
Nimmer characterizes the issue in the treatise as an 
“interpretative puzzle” rather than a matter of ascertainable 
jurisprudence,112 which obscures the rather stunning nature of 
the transformation. After concluding that courts “are deeply 
divided on the scope of the distribution right,” a highly 
debatable assertion, the treatise states: 
The point of commonality among these opinions is that none of them 
went back to examine the rich trove of legislative materials from the 
early to mid-1960s and early 1970s explicating Congress’s intent in 
shifting terminology from the 1909 rights to publish and vend to the 
                                                                                                                       
Copyrights, to Rep. Howard Berman, from the 28th Dist. of Cal. 
(Sept. 25, 2002) (“[M]aking [a work] available for other users of [a] 
peer to peer network to download . . . constitutes an infringement of 
the exclusive distribution right, as well as the reproduction right.”). 
William Patry, A Making Available Right?, PATRY COPYRIGHT BLOG (Mar. 2, 2007, 
11:39 AM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2007/03/making-available-right.html 
(alterations in original). 
 109 See Menell, supra note 104, at 20 n.90 (“The discussion that follows is 
based upon the version of Nimmer on Copyright that was available to jurists and 
practitioners through August 2011.”). 
 110 See e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 (D. 
Minn. 2008) (citing 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8.11 [A]) 
(“Additionally, the leading copyright treatises conclude that making a work available is 
insufficient to establish distribution.”); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 
976, 976 (D. Ariz. 2008) (quoting 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8.11[A]) 
(“Infringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination of either 
copies or phonorecords.”); Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 
243 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER § 8.11 [A] n.2)(“[N]ote that an 
offer to distribute copies or phonorecords to the public may in itself constitute a 
‘publication,’ while the right of distribution apparently is not infringed by the mere 
offer to distribute to members of the public.”). 
 111 See, e.g., Devin Hartline, Nimmer Changes His Tune: “Making Available” Is 
Distribution, COPYHYPE (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.copyhype.com/2012/10/nimmer-changes-
his-tune-making-available-is-distribution/ (“Several courts have consulted Nimmer on 
Copyright when analyzing whether ‘making available’ constitutes distribution. As recently 
as 2011, the treatise took the position that infringement of the distribution right requires 
actual dissemination of copies of a work to the public. But in the latest edition, Nimmer has 
changed his tune—the treatise now states that ‘making available’ is distribution simpliciter. 
After a detailed examination of the legislative history of the current Copyright Act, Nimmer 
now concludes that ‘the distribution right was formulated precisely so that it would extend 
to making copyrighted works available, rather than mandating proof of actual activities of 
distribution.’” (citations omitted)); Horsfield-Bradbury, supra note 105; Robert Kasinic, 
Making Circumstantial Proof of Distribution Available, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 1145, 1145 (2008). 
 112 2 M. B. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8.11 [B][4][a]. 
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1976 Act’s right to “distribute,” and at the same time expanding the 
definition “publication” to include offers to distribute.113 
So rather than mine extant case law for the currently 
prevailing judicial viewpoints, the treatise purports to divine 
the intentions of Congress with respect to Internet postings 
and downloading in 2013 based on diffuse words and actions 
predating passage of the Copyright Act of 1976. After a lengthy 
(more than 10,000 words excluding footnotes) and didactic 
discussion of the issue’s purportedly expansive history, the 
treatise states of the extant case law: “In sum, the courts have 
been divided.”114 This is followed by a handily bolded subheading 
for understandably skimming readers: “Conclusion: Making 
Works Available Via File-Sharing Implicates the Distribution 
Right,” with appended text stating: 
Going back to the seminal reports of the 1960s and applying them to 
the technologies of the 2010s cements the proposition that there is 
no need to show consummated acts of actual distribution. Instead, 
the intent of Congress was to incorporate a “make available” right 
into the copyright owner’s arsenal.115 
With these words Nimmer seeks to upgrade content 
owners’ “arsenals” with a new copyright enforcing weapon that 
was divined via a “lost ark,” and is now fixed in “cement.” That is 
a startling move by what is ostensibly an interpretative guide, 
because it advocates significantly changing the balance of online 
copyright law in favor of copyright holders without any even 
vaguely contemporary signal from Congress or congruent ruling 
within the federal judiciary. 
4. Volition 
Volition is an important concept in the Internet age.116 A 
number of courts have held that a person or entity must engage 
in a volitional act of copying to be directly liable for 
infringement.117 For example, in Religious Technology Center v. 
 
 113 Id. § 8.11 [D][1]. 
 114 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 61, § 8.11 [C][1][b][3][a]. 
 115 Id. § 8.11 [D][4][c]. 
 116 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber 
Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 
1833, 1833 (2000); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1345 (2004). 
 117 Copyright: Infringement Issues, INTERNET LAW TREATISE, https://ilt.eff.org/
index.php/Copyright:_Infringement_Issues (last visited Nov. 17, 2013); Religious Tech. 
Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’ns Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 
1995) (holding an ISP serving as a passive conduit for copyrighted material not liable 
 
2014] RESTATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW 487 
Netcom On-Line Communications Services, the court held that 
an Internet Service Provider (ISP) serving as a passive conduit 
for copyrighted material is not liable as a direct infringer, 
reasoning that “[a]lthough copyright is a strict liability statute, 
there should still be some element of volition or causation which 
is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to use a copy 
by a third party.”118 David Nimmer’s assertion both professionally 
at conferences119 and in the Nimmer treatise that copyright has no 
volition requirement at all is fairly controversial.120 This view 
imposes upon ISPs such an extremely onerous duty to police the 
content moving through their clouds and servers that the burden 
could prove incapacitating to their very existence. One judge 
acerbically noted: “The distinguished commentator David Nimmer 
does not consider volitional conduct on the part of the defendant as 
a necessary element to establish direct infringement” before 
rejecting this view and determining that the passive processing of 
users’ uploads was unlikely to establish that Google had directly 
infringed copyrights.121 Another commentator more colorfully 
                                                                                                                       
as a direct infringer, and requiring a volitional act for a direct infringement claim: 
“Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of 
volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to use 
a copy by a third party.”); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 
2004) (“Agreeing with the analysis in Netcom, we hold that the automatic copying, 
storage, and transmission of copyrighted materials, when instigated by others, does not 
render an ISP strictly liable for copyright infringement under §§ 501 and 106 of the 
Copyright Act.”). 
 118 Religious Tech. Ctr., 907 F. Supp. at 1370. 
 119 See, e.g., David Nimmer, Brains and Other Paraphernalia of the Digital 
Age, 10 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1 (1996) (as presented by David Nimmer, Jan. 22, 1996 as part 
of a continuing education course); David Nimmer, Continuing Legal Education Course 
Materials, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, C579 ALI-ABA 149 (Mar. 20, 1991). Cf. 
Plaintiff Perfect 10, Inc.’s Opposition to Defendant Megaupload Ltd.’s Motion to Dismiss at 
15, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11CV0191-IEG(BLM), 2011 WL 3203117 (S.D. 
Cal., July 27, 2011), vacated by No.11CV0191-IEG(BLM), 2011 WL 10618723 (S.D. Cal., 
Oct. 11, 2011); Answering Brief of Defendants—Appellees Amazon.com, Inc. and A9.com, 
Inc. at 28, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 487 F.3d 701, amended and superseded by 
508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Elenor M. Lackman & Scott J. Sholder, The Role of Volition 
in Evaluating Direct Copyright Infringement Claims Against Technology Providers, 22 
BRIGHT IDEAS Winter 2013 at 6, n.48. 
 120 See Carrie Bodner, Master Copies, Unique Copies and Volitional Conduct: 
Cartoon Network’s Implications for the Liability of Cyber Lockers, 36 COLUM. J. L. & 
ARTS 491 (2013), available at http://www.lawandarts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/
4-Bodner_post-format.pdf; Mathew D. Lawless, Against Search Engine Volition, 8 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205 (2008). 
 121 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM (SHx), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 145449 at *24, n.8 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010); see also Parker v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. 
CV 07-2757, 2008 WL 4410095 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2008) (“Although copyright 
infringement generally operates under a theory of strict liability, various courts have 
required an additional element of ‘volition or causation’ to find direct infringement. 
E.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2004); Religious 
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372 (N.D. Cal. 
1995). But see [3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 44, 
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observed: “This makes me want to post pirated content on David 
Nimmer’s site without his knowledge, just to see if he’ll give in and 
pay statutory damages.”122 
5. Preliminary Injunctions and the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm 
Injunctive relief is a powerful tool which can end 
infringing behavior quickly, but also cause harms of its own.123 
Professor Pamela Samuelson wrote in 2010: 
It has become lamentably common for courts to issue preliminary 
injunctions in copyright cases once rights holders have shown a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits without going on to 
require them to prove that they will suffer irreparable harm unless the 
injunction is issued. Harm is too often presumed to be irreparable if 
plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of infringement. This 
presumption cannot be squared with traditional principles of equity, as 
interpreted in numerous Supreme Court decisions.124 
Large scale content owners benefitted greatly from a 
“presumption of irreparable harm” jurisprudential approach to 
preliminary injunctions that made them easy to obtain by 
copyright holders, an approach the Nimmer treatise heartily 
endorsed.125 After the Supreme Court’s ruling in a patent law 
case, eBay v. Merc Exchange, made the “presumption of 
irreparable harm” position analytically untenable in the copyright 
context, one judge expressly noted the impact this had on the 
Nimmer treatise, writing: 
Before eBay, Nimmer on Copyright was routinely cited as supporting 
the presumption. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer 
Corp., 714 F.2d at 1254 (citing 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 14.06[A], at 
14–50, 14–51 & n.16 (collecting authorities)). Nimmer has now seen the 
light, and recognizes that even in the context of preliminary injunctions 
in a copyright infringement claim, “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in 
eBay caused a new day to dawn . . . . No longer applicable is the 
presumption of irreparable harm, which allowed the collapse of factors 
that plaintiff must prove down to one. As one commentator notes, 
                                                                                                                       
§ 12B.06[B][2][c][ii]] (arguing that the text and legislative history of the Copyright Act 
show that volition is only one of several considerations and not a decisive factor).”). 
 122 E-mail from Anonymous Professor to Author (on file with author).  
 123 Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why Plaintiffs Should Have to 
Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction Cases, 6 ISJLP 67 (2010); 
K.J. Greene, Motion Picture Copyright Infringement and the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 173 (2000). 
 124 Samuelson & Bebenek, supra note 123. 
 125 4 NIMMER, supra note 56, § 14.06 [A][2][b] & n.16 (“A copyright plaintiff 
who makes out a prima facie case of infringement is entitled to a preliminary 
injunction without a detailed showing of irreparable harm.”). 
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‘Harm must be proved, not presumed.’” 4 Nimmer on Copyright 
§ 14.06[A][5], at 14–149 (footnotes omitted).126 
What is remarkable about the preliminary injunctions 
section of the current edition of the Nimmer treatise is not that 
it correctly reports the law, but that it buries its discussion of 
the eBay decision so deeply. The reader has to plow through 
numerous confusing paragraphs like this: 
Many cases state “the prevailing view that a showing of a prima 
facie case of copyright infringement, or reasonable likelihood of 
success on the merits, raises a presumption of irreparable harm.” 
Pursuant to that approach, under the predominant test set forth 
above, the plaintiff ’ s burden for obtaining a preliminary injunction 
in copyright cases reduces to showing likelihood of success on the 
merits, without a detailed showing of danger of irreparable harm. As 
the Second Circuit observed, “Since defendant sells essentially the 
same product as plaintiff to the same market, it will obviously suffer 
considerable loss if defendant disseminates its prayerbook, because 
each sale of defendant’s prayerbook probably results in one less sale 
of plaintiff ’ s prayerbook.” The harm in that case was apparent, 
given that the primary market for the product was synagogues, 
which “have no use for two separate prayerbooks.”127 
Much later in the section on remedies the Nimmer 
treatise finally notes: 
eBay v. MercExchange dealt with a permanent injunction under the 
Patent Act. Subsequent rulings have applied it to preliminary 
injunctions under the Patent Act. Given that the Court reached its 
ruling by noting that “this Court has consistently rejected invitations 
to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an 
injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright 
has been infringed,” it only makes sense to apply it to the instant 
domain of enjoining copyright infringement as well. After all, if 
discretion attends the determination of whether to enjoin defendants 
whose cases have been adversely adjudicated to completion, it 
follows a fortiori that district courts may exercise their discretion to 
withhold injunctive relief pending trial when the ultimate 
disposition remains uncertain, even given a strong likelihood of 
success on the merits. 
Accordingly, eBay occasions re-evaluation of the standards 
previously articulated for issuance of preliminary injunctions. The 
predominant test invokes only two factors, which collapse into one. 
More consonant with the four factors mandated under eBay are the 
four factors of the variant test noted above. Of course, given that the 
Court in eBay was addressing the remedy after a finding of liability, 
 
 126 Flexible Lifeline Systems, Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 999-
1000 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 127 5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06 
[A][2][b] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2013). 
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it did not refer to the “likelihood of success.” In the context of a 
preliminary injunction, that consideration is obviously at the 
forefront of the court’s determination, under every formulation. 
Accordingly, the variant test quoted above best sets out the four 
factors that would seem to govern at present.128 
And it still is not until many subsections later that 
Nimmer’s “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in eBay caused a new 
day to dawn” comment cited by the court finally surfaces.129 
Anyone looking to the Nimmer treatise for a clear statement of 
the current standard for obtaining preliminary injunctions in 
copyright infringement cases is likely to be sorely disappointed, 
and possibly also deeply confused. An admirer of the Nimmer 
treatise recently wrote that it adopts “a classic Socratic method 
of legal writing.”130 Not everyone seeking answers within it will 
consider that an advantage. 
C. An Illustrated Illustration of Everything that is Wrong 
with Allowing the Nimmer Treatise to Drive Copyright 
Law: A Tale of Two Tattoos131 
 
 
 128 Id. § 14.06 [A][3][a]. 
 129 Id. § 14.06 [A][5][a][i]. 
 130 Field, supra note 62 (“In Nimmer on Copyright, everything is questioned, 
everything is examined, and nothing is taken at face value without thorough research, 
analysis, and context. Question marks abound in the text, followed by thorough 
answers. This classic Socratic method of legal writing informs the overall structure of 
the treatise via sub-sections whose title announces their purpose to offer criticism of a 
doctrine, or examination of the rationale behind the law.”). 
 131 The images below were taken from the publicly filed complaint in the case 
Whitmill v. Warner Brothers Entertainment. Complaint at 5, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. 
Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 28, 2011), ECF No. 1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/21/business/media/20110521tattoo-case.html. 
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In 2011 tattoo artist Victor Whitmill was distressed to 
learn that a tattoo he created for the face of former boxer Mike 
Tyson was being used on the face of a character in the movie 
Hangover II without his permission.132 He believed that Warner 
Brothers Entertainment, Inc., the producer of Hangover II, was 
infringing his copyright in the tattoo by reproducing and using 
it without licensing the rights, so he hired an attorney and 
commenced litigation.133 One reporter observed: 
Plaintiff and tattoo artist S. Victor Whitmill filed the instant lawsuit 
in April, asserting copyright infringement in connection with a fake 
tattoo drawn on the face of actor Ed Helms in the film. The tattoo is 
nearly identical to the real life tattoo created by Whitmill for former 
world heavyweight champion boxer Mike Tyson, who also appears in 
the film. Whitmill asserts that when he created the original tattoo 
for Tyson, Tyson agreed Whitmill would own all relevant artwork 
and copyright associated with the design. 
For Mr. Whitmill, this case is not about Mike Tyson, Mike Tyson’s 
likeness, or Mike Tyson’s right to use or control his identity. This 
case is about Warner Bros. appropriation of Mr. Whitmill’s art and 
Warner Bros. unauthorized use of that art, separate and apart from 
Mr. Tyson. Not only is this infringing copy (the “Pirated Tattoo) used 
throughout the movie, but Warner Bros. also uses the Pirated Tattoo 
extensively in advertisements and promotions without Mr. Tyson. 
This unauthorized exploitation of the Original Tattoo constitutes 
copyright infringement,” Whitmill asserted in his complaint.134 
The disputed tattoo was used extensively in the 
advertising campaign for the movie, licensed 7-Eleven 
promotional tie-ins, and in an iPhone app.135 Whitmill 
characterized it as a “central plot device,”136 and its importance 
to the movie was acknowledged by Warner Brothers in its 
pleadings, which admitted that the tattoo appeared in its 
significant promotional campaign for the film.137 
 
 132 Complaint ¶ 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. 
Apr. 28, 2011), ECF No. 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/
21/business/media/20110521tattoo-case.html. 
 133 See id. 
 134 Mo. Federal Judge Denies Injuction in ‘Hangover 2’ Copyright Dispute, 10-5 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. COPYRIGHT (June 6, 2011); see also Verified Complaint for 
Injunctive and Other Relief at 1, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 
(E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011) (alteration in original). 
 135 Plaintiff ’ s Reply Memorandum in Support of His Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 2, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011). 
 136 Id. 
 137 See Warner Bros.’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff ’ s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. 
May 20, 2011). 
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Warner Brothers Entertainment, which produced the 
movie, often takes a self-serving position in favor of strong 
copyright protections, lobbying Congress and advocating for 
cultural “respect for copyrights”138 through the Motion Picture 
Association of America139 in partnership with other large movie 
companies. So when Mr. Whitmill brought a copyright 
infringement suit against it, one imagines Warner Brothers’s 
attorneys might have been fairly enthusiastic about taking a 
position in defense of the infringement charges that did not make 
Warner Brothers look stunningly hypocritical on the issue of 
unauthorized copying. The position they adopted was that 
tattoos were simply not copyrightable subject matter. Because 
no tattoo could correctly be copyright protected, this argument 
averred, there was no copyright that could be infringed when 
the tattoo at issue was copied. 
Warner Brothers Entertainment had a big problem, 
however, and that problem was volume three of Nimmer’s 
Treatise, which referenced within its pages a copyright case about 
tattoos, Owens v. Ink Wizard Tattoos.140 At the time, footnote 392 
of this section of the Nimmer treatise said: 
More questionable, however, was its later statement that no “remedy 
at law would prevent the Owenses from photocopying distributing 
and using the flash . . . .” For a tattoo may presumably qualify as a 
work of graphic art, regardless of the medium in which it is designed 
to be affixed (in this instance, human flesh).141  
Next, Warner Brothers Entertainment hired David 
Nimmer as an expert witness for the litigation,142 most likely with 
the hope that he would recant this position in favor of the 
copyrightability of tattoos ascribed to him for approximately 11 
years as author of his treatise. Recant he did, writing in a 
declaration that Warner Brothers Entertainment somehow 
passed off as admissible evidence: 
 
 138 Content Protection, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/contentprotection (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 139 About Us, MPAA, http://www.mpaa.org/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2013). 
 140 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 1.01 [B][1][i] n.392 (citing 
Owens et al. v. Ink Wizard Tattoos, 533 S.E.2d 722, 724 (Ga. 2000)). 
 141 See E-mail from Neil Myers, Lexisnexis employee and editor of the 
Nimmer treatise, to Cynthia Pittson, Professor of Law, Pace Law School (May 23, 2013) 
(on file with author). 
 142 Decl. of David Nimmer at ¶ 2, Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-
cv-752 (E.D. Mo. May 20, 2011), ECF No. 29-6 (“Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. has 
retained my services, through Irell & Manella LLP, in connection with the above-
captioned case.”). 
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In years past, I tacitly assumed that a tattoo could “presumably 
qualify as a work of graphic art, regardless of the medium in which 
it is designed to be affixed” such as “human flesh.” In writing up a 
2000 case, I even posited one line to that effect in a footnote, without 
purporting to cite any authority in support. See 1 Nimmer on 
Copyright Section 1.01[B][1][i]n.392.143 
Nimmer’s declaration is noticeably vague about during 
which years or for how many years his treatise expressly asserted 
that tattoos were copyrightable. He alludes to “writing up a 2000 
case” to imply that it was in the year 2000 that he “posited” that 
tattoos were copyrightable.144 Elsewhere in the declaration he 
says that he had a change of heart in 2001, writing: 
About a decade ago, in composing a book-length treatment of 
copyright subsistence, I began to reconsider that proposition. In 
sketching out a score of different cases, I formulated one to consider 
whether a human body may ever qualify as the requisite “medium of 
expression” to secure copyright protection. After first ruminating 
that a court faced with such a claim should “dismiss it summarily, if 
on no other basis than the constitutional prohibition on involuntary 
servitude and other badges of slavery,” I concluded that “a body, 
even as augmented, simply is not subject to copyright protection.”145 
What Nimmer glaringly neglects to mention is that he 
wrote these words in 2001 about copyright claims a plastic 
surgeon might make with respect to the entire body of a patient, 
not a tattoo. Far more problematic, however, is the impression he 
creates about the timeline of his views. He mentions “writing up a 
2000 case” as a platform for positing that tattoos are 
copyrightable, and then writing a law review article in 2001 
reflecting a change of heart. The reader is encouraged to assume 
that he simply neglected to update his treatise on this matter in 
the intervening decade. One might be very surprised to learn, 
then, that the version of Footnote 392 endorsing the 
copyrightability of tattoos was not added to the treatise until 
2007! Nimmer may have been “writing up a 2000 case” when 
he authored that version of the footnote, but he did not publish 
it until 2007, six years after his supposed change of heart on 
the matter referenced in his declaration.146 
 
 143 See id. ¶ 15. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. ¶ 16 (emphasis added). 
 146 E-mail from Neil Myers, supra note 141. 
Dear Cynthia, 
I think that I can be of some help here. We do not have records going back to 
2000, but I can trace this particular footnote back to its inception. 
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The December 2008 and August 2010 versions of the 
treatise retained Nimmer’s endorsement of copyrightability of 
tattoos.147 By the time the declaration was submitted to the 
court, however, the online version of the Nimmer treatise may 
already have been sanitized to suit his new position. No later 
than December of 2011, paper version updates were issued in 
which the footnote he referenced, n.392, was quietly altered to 
read: “More questionable, however, was its later statement that 
no ‘remedy at law would prevent the Owenses from photocopying 
distributing and using the flash . . . . For the image may 
presumably qualify as a work of graphic art.’”148 Neither the 
                                                                                                                       
Section 1.01[B][1][i], then entitled “Conversion and Trespass,” was split and 
completely revised in Release 73 (August 2007). Owens v. Ink Wizard Tattoos 
did not appear in the earlier coverage; it was added in footnote 392 as part of 
the 2007 revision. I have attached a PDF file setting out the text of text of 
former subsection [i] as it appeared before the revision. 
As updated in Release 73 (August 2007), new footnote 392 read as follows 
(see attached PDF): 
 392533 S.E.2d at 724. More questionable, however, was its later statement 
that no “remedy at law would prevent the Owenses from photocopying 
distributing and using the flash . . . .” Id. at 724. For a tattoo may 
presumably qualify as a work of graphic art, regardless of the medium in 
which it is designed to be affixed (in this instance, human flesh). See 
§ 2.08[B][3] infra. 
In Release 86 (December 2011), footnote 392 was revised again to read as you 
see it today (also in the attached PDF): 
392533 S.E.2d at 724. More questionable, however, was its later statement 
that no “remedy at law would prevent the Owenses from photocopying 
distributing and using the flash . . . .” Id. at 724. For the image may 
presumably qualify as a work of graphic art. See § 2.08[B][3] infra. 
I hope that this is useful to you. 
Neil  
 147 Copies on file with author and with the Brooklyn Law Review.  
 148 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 32, § 1.01 [B][1][i] n.392. Later in 
the same section, Nimmer states: 
Allegations of conversion can arise in a myriad of settings. One case held pre-
empted claims of conversion and unjust enrichment for defendant airline’s 
use of computer macros that plaintiff authored. An architect was aggrieved 
when his plans were used to construct a building; the court upheld his breach 
of contract count, but dismissed the conversion claim as pre-empted. If the 
complaint is for licensing of photographs, it could be pre-empted; but if for 
return of wrongfully retained original chromes, it is not. In one case, the 
alleged conversion was of “flash,” namely “pre-printed tattoo designs which a 
customer views and chooses from in deciding what design to have placed on 
the customer’s body.” Given that such flash consists of a tangible work, the 
Georgia Supreme Court was correct to allow the conversion cause of action to 
proceed on the basis that “Mr. Owens stole the flash.” 
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deletion of the words “regardless of the medium in which it is 
designed to be affixed (in this instance, human flesh)” nor the 
reason for the edit is noted, and if one had not been aware of 
the previous iteration of n.392 for external reasons, there 
would be no way to know the leading treatise on copyright law 
was now leading readers in an alternative direction. 
Not content to simply refer to an express statement as a 
“tacit assumption,” Nimmer walked back his actual expressed 
words by invoking rather histrionic analogies. First he declared 
that if the tattoo was deemed to qualify for protection under the 
Visual Artists Rights Act (an unlikely possibility at best, to put it 
lightly149), copyright law “thereby becomes the instrument to 
impose, almost literally, a badge of involuntary servitude, akin to 
the mark with which ranchers brand the cattle they own.”150 It 
sounds as if he is saying that by freely choosing to have Whitmill 
fix the tattoo of his choosing to his face, Mike Tyson ceded some 
sort of ownership interest in his body to Whitmill, enforced by 
copyright law. Lest that be too subtle, a few sentences later, 
Nimmer declares: 
If Mr. Tyson chooses to obtain an adjacent or overlapping tattoo on 
his face, he will have compromised the copyright owner’s right to 
prepare derivative works, thereby becoming a copyright infringer. As 
such, he is subject to a court order that the offending work be 
destroyed. A court that vindicates Mr. Whitmill’s statutory rights by 
ordering laser removal of the unauthorized product has allowed the 
Copyright Act to be perverted, once again, into an instrument 
rendering Mr. Tyson into a virtual slave.151 
Nimmer’s invocations of involuntary servitude (referenced 
in the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,152 and 
more contemporarily within the criminal code’s prohibitions on 
human trafficking153), of branding (which was routinely imposed 
upon slaves in the United States before the Emancipation 
                                                                                                                       
Id. § 1.01 [B][1][i] (citations omitted); see also SHARON FORSCHER, THE VISUAL ARTISTS 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1990 (Philadelphia Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, 2008), available at 
http://www.artsandbusinessphila.org/pvla/documents/VisualArtistsAct.pdf. 
 149 See, e.g., Cynthia Esworthy, From Monty Python to Leona Hemsley: A 
Guide to the Visual Artists Rights Act, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/martin/art_law/esworthy.htm. 
 150 Decl. of David Nimmer, supra note 142, ¶ 20(a) (emphasis added). 
 151 Id. ¶ 20(b) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 152 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
 153 Involuntary Servitude, Forced Labor, and Sex Trafficking Statutes 
Enforced, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/crm/1581fin.php (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
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Proclamation and Thirteenth Amendment freed them154) and of 
virtual slavery when discussing a tattoo freely chosen by an 
African American celebrity are rather shocking. I’m inclined to 
agree with David Nimmer’s assertions in his affidavit that certain 
mechanisms of copyright enforcement, already troubling from a 
personal property perspective when applied to the owner of 
copyrighted painting, would be excessively harsh if applied to a 
human face. Unlike David Nimmer, though, I credit judges with 
the ability to enforce copyright protections in a manner that does 
not force people into involuntary servitude or virtual slavery.155 
Professor Douglas Lichtman was also unpersuaded by Nimmer’s 
arguments in this matter, writing: 
I find Nimmer’s declaration shockingly unconvincing. Had Nimmer 
argued that Warner Brothers’ use of the tattoo is fair use, he might 
very well have had me on his side. Had he argued that certain 
copyright remedies are off the table in instances when some 
otherwise-traditional remedy would (if applied here) constrain 
significant personal freedoms like the freedom to show one’s own 
face in public, fine. But Nimmer argued that the tattoo is not eligible 
for protection because it is not “fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression” and thus fell short of a threshold requirement that is 
codified in Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act. That makes no 
sense.156 
Some observers found it astonishing that David 
Nimmer’s declaration was even admitted into evidence, given 
that it contains legal arguments, not assertions of fact, and 
what Nimmer says is therefore not “evidence.” Attorney C.E. 
Petit noted: 
Perhaps Professor Bartow herself is too polite to note it; perhaps she 
is a bit too removed from practice to have noticed it; but I found yet 
another ridiculous aspect of Professor Nimmer’s change of opinion: 
It’s in an improper document that the court should never have 
 
 154 Frederick Douglass, The Horrors of Slavery and England’s Duty to Free the 
Bondsman, in THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 371 (1979), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/glc/archive/1081.htm; Leonard J. Hoenig, The Branding of African 
American Slaves, 148 JAMA DERMATOLOGY, Feb. 2012; The Growth of Slavery in North 
America, PBS ONLINE http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part1/1narr5.html (last visited Nov. 17, 
2013); REV. THEODORE DWIGHT WELD ET AL., AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS: TESTIMONY OF 
A THOUSAND WITNESSES 21 (1839), available at http://medicolegal.tripod.com/
weldslaveryasis.htm#p21-branded; Branding Iron, UNDERSTANDING SLAVERY INITIATIVE, 
http://understandingslavery.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
622:branding-iron&catid=146&Itemid=256 (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).  
 155 For a detailed discussion of the legal issues involved in copyrighting 
tattoos, see Yolanda M. King, The Challenges “Facing” Copyright Protection for 
Tattoos”, 92 OR. L. Rev. 129 (2013). 
 156 Douglas Lichtman, Are Tattoos Eligible for Copyright Protection?, THE 
MEDIA INSTITUTE (June 15, 2011), http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/2011/061511.php. 
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allowed to be filed. An expert opinion may only “assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” (Fed. 
R. Evid 702, emphasis added). Arguments about the law are for the 
lawyers and to the judge only; if one wishes to bring in material from 
a “legal expert,” the proper method to do so is via citation to legal 
authority. There’s nothing wrong with that citation being to a yet-to-
be-published work—so long as one provides copies to both the judge 
and the other side—but putting an interpretation of legal doctrine in 
as an “expert opinion” is flat wrong. Another big LA law firm tried 
this BS in the Ellison matter to no avail. You’d think they’d learn 
that if they’re going to tell the judge what the law is, they should do 
so in the context of telling the judge what the law is.157 
The judge did at least, to her credit, ultimately decline 
to allow David Nimmer to testify, despite Warner Brothers’ 
assertion that “Professor Nimmer’s testimony about this very 
obscure and novel issue of copyright law on which he is clearly 
an expert [would] be helpful to the Court.”158 Nor was she 
persuaded by his affidavit, describing his arguments as “just 
silly” in her ruling on the preliminary injunction motion, where 
the judge wrote: 
If I look at the likelihood of success on the merits, I think plaintiff 
has a strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits for copyright 
infringement. 
Most of the defendant’s arguments against this are just silly. Of 
course tattoos can be copyrighted. I don’t think there is any 
reasonable dispute about that. They are not copyrighting Mr. 
Tyson’s face, or restricting Mr. Tyson’s use of his own face, as the 
defendant argues, or saying that someone who has a tattoo can’t 
remove the tattoo or change it, but the tattoo itself and the design 
itself can be copyrighted, and I think it’s entirely consistent with the 
copyright law, and after all, in this case, Mr. Whitmill and Mr. Tyson 
did have a contract dealing with this issue, which is totally 
consistent and appropriate under copyright law.159 
Unsurprisingly, the case settled soon afterward.160 There is 
an odd coda to this case, though, related to the official transcripts. 
Although the transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing was 
initially a matter of public record, Warner Brothers successfully 
 
 157 A Matter of Internet and Symbolism, SCRIVENER’S ERROR (May 30, 2011, 2:15 
PM), http://scrivenerserror.blogspot.com/2011/05/b530x.html (emphasis in original). 
 158 Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 58, Whitmill v. Warner 
Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. May 23, 2011). 
 159 Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Preliminary Injunction II at 3, 
Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 4:11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo. May 24, 2011). 
 160 Justin Tenuto, Warner Bros. Settles Tyson Tattoo Case Over Hangover II, 
ARTICLE3 (June 21, 2011), http://www.article-3.com/warner-bros-settles-tyson-tattoo-
case-over-hangover-ii-92253. 
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petitioned the court to retroactively place it under seal, and now 
the only publicly available transcript is a redacted one. 
III. A RESTATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT WOULD BE A BETTER 
TREATISE 
I wholeheartedly agree with Copyright Register 
Pallante about the need for copyright law reform, and would 
add that it is time for a new leading treatise. That new treatise 
should take the form of a Restatement of Copyright Law. 
A. It Would Be Better Than Any Treatise Produced by a 
Sole Author 
Ideally the Restatement would explain the settled 
aspects of copyright law in as neutral and coherent a fashion as 
possible. It would chart gaps and shifts within the law, and 
indicate when an author is stating her own prediction or 
recommendation at clear interstices, leaving room for a visible, 
measured debate about contested points of law whenever 
practicable. Perhaps at times there would be pitched battles 
within its pages, written debates about doctrinal disputes 
accessible to every reader. On other matters a clear consensus 
would prevail and inform. An ALI committee could ensure that 
all this happened more effectively than any individual. A 
Restatement of Copyright Law could provide a competing 
source of useful and well-organized information to courts, 
lawyers, and anyone else who is slavishly following and citing a 
particular copyright treatise due to either a lack of reflection or 
a lack of options. Such a Restatement offers the tantalizing 
possibility of a less biased, and more balanced exposition of 
copyright law than is currently available, and one that is born 
authoritative because it is imbued with the gravitas of the ALI. 
This in turn might lead to improved understandings of 
copyright law issues, and therefore better (or at least better 
informed) judicial decision making. 
This is not to suggest that the ALI process is perfect. In 
his article “When the Restatement is Not a Restatement” David 
Logan, adviser for the Restatement (Third) of Torts, wrote: 
The handling of flagrant trespassers thus lays bare the core tension 
that exists in the very DNA of the elite and undemocratic ALI: 
whether it should be a force for bold law reform or [ ] merely a tidier 
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of messy common law doctrine, whether it should stake out “what 
law should be” rather than merely stating “what the law is.”161 
Admittedly, the shape of ALI projects can be determined 
to a large extent by the views of the people willing to step up 
and do the work. Members who are the most enthusiastic about 
attending and participating in consultative meetings may have 
strong motivations that could build into a Restatement of 
Copyright Law some of the same problems raised here about 
currently existing treatises. Certainly the history surrounding the 
failed ALI UCC Article 2B initiative in the late 1990s can be 
viewed as a cautionary tale.162 On the other hand, the ugliness 
and strife surrounding it were at least on the record and well 
known to the various stakeholders, as is illustrated below. 
The ALI has recently been accused of being unduly 
influenced by the tobacco industry, and of having inadequate 
conflict of interest policies.163 In response, ALI President 
Roberta Ramo and ALI Director Lance Liebman asserted: 
The legal scholars who serve as Reporters on ALI projects receive 
comments and criticisms from many sources, in large and small 
meetings, by letter, and in emails. The ALI Archives at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, open to all, contain drafts, 
notes, and comments that reveal how our projects and our resulting 
recommendations for improving the law evolve. Our Advisers, 
Members Consultative Groups, Council, and full Membership, 
through debate, motions, and votes, decide what ALI’s 
recommendations to judges and legislatures will be. No one is 
disenfranchised or muzzled, nor should they be. 
An ALI rule tells members to “leave our clients at the door,” and it is 
a point of honor among members that we state what we personally 
believe to be right, not what our clients want us to say. But it is 
equally important that we make certain that all significant points of 
view are represented and explained. New Restatement work is 
always underway, identifying imperfections in earlier versions, 
 
 161 David A. Logan, When the Restatement Is Not a Restatement: The Curious 
Case of the “Flagrant Trespasser,” 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1483 (2011). 
 162 See e.g. Cem Kaner, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B: A New Law of 
Software Quality, BAD SOFTWARE (Nov. 10, 1997), http://www.badsoftware.com/uccsqa.htm; 
Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, Licensing Information in the Global Information 
Market: Freedom of Contract Meets Public Policy, BERKELEYLAW (May 31, 2002), 
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/2bEIPR.pdf; Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Stop 
Mucking Up Copyright Law: A Proposal for a Federal Common Law of Contract, 35 
RUTGERS L. J. 959 (2004); Caroline Edwards, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
and Consumer Protection: The Refusal to Experiment, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 663 (2004). 
 163 Elizabeth Laposata et al., Tobacco Industry Influence on the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement of Torts and Implications for Its Conflict of Interest Policies 98 
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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responding to new information and evidence, and seeking legal 
doctrine that fits contemporary values.164  
Assuming this is accurate, it sounds like a process likely 
to produce a more useful and effective copyright treatise than 
any individual would ever be capable of, as a matter of scalable 
resources, if nothing else. However, it needs to be noted that in 
surrebuttal the ALI tobacco bias accusers maintained: 
The ALI response ignored the core conclusions of our paper: (1) the 
ALI allowed its work to be secretly manipulated by the tobacco 
industry in large part because of the ALI’s lack of strict conflict of 
interest policies, and (2) policy makers should not rely on ALI works 
until the ALI implements modern conflict of interest procedures. 
The tobacco industry documents that led to these conclusions speak 
for themselves. The ALI did not dispute either the substance of these 
conclusions or the validity of the documentary evidence we presented 
to support them, nor did it offer any evidence in rebuttal of the case 
we presented. 
We compared the ALI’s conflict of interest policies to the National 
Academies’ because both organizations create works that provide 
scholarly advice to policy makers, while purporting to be based on a 
neutral reading of the evidence. In stark contrast to the ALI, the 
National Academies have strict conflict of interest policies that 
reflect the reality that even the most talented scientists, engineers, 
and physicians are still human beings, and it may be difficult for 
them to “leave [their] clients at the door.” 
Far from misunderstanding the processes that the ALI uses to 
produce the Restatements, we presented extensive documentary 
evidence that the tobacco industry circumvented those processes and 
held a backroom meeting with the Reporter for the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts. This backroom meeting was followed by industry-
sought changes to the Restatement that effectively shielded the 
tobacco industry from liability for the death and disease suffered by 
its customers for decades.165 
The authors further claimed that 
the Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts met secretly with 
tobacco industry lawyers and did their bidding; that tobacco industry 
lawyers had off-the-record access to key figures in the drafting of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, resulting in changes the tobacco 
 
 164 Roberta Cooper Ramo & Lance Liebman, The ALI’s Response to the Center for 
Tobacco Control Research & Education, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 1 (Jan. 19, 2013). 
 165 Elizabeth Laposata et al., Authors’ Reply: The ALI Needs to Implement Modern 
Conflict of Interest Policies, 98 IOWA L. REV. BULLETIN 17, 17-18 (Feb. 21, 2013). 
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industry sought; and that Victor Schwartz billed Philip Morris for 
his time as an ALI Advisor.166  
These are certainly alarming allegations. One hopes 
that in the wake of them, the ALI will act energetically to 
reduce the likelihood of similar problems in the future. But 
even if they do not, it still strikes me as far harder to corrupt a 
Restatement process than it is to unduly influence a single 
treatise author. 
B. It Would Solve the Problem of Invisible Changes and 
Disappearing Law 
The disappearance of source materials is a pernicious 
problem.167 When a treatise changes, there may not be any 
evidence whatsoever within its pages. As described above, after 
David Nimmer was hired by Warner Brothers in the Whitmill 
“Hangover 2 Tattoo” case, he changed footnote 392 in the 
Nimmer Treatise without leaving a notation. It is difficult and 
onerous, even with the assistance of competent and 
experienced law librarians, to reconstruct the evolution of any 
particular point of law through the various iterations of the 
Nimmer treatise. And one usually cannot confidently pin down 
that exact date of the change. If lawyers or judges did not know 
there had been a change, there is nothing in the treatise to 
inform them about it. Nor is there any way to anticipate when 
a change is imminent. 
 
 166 Id. at 18-19; see also Sglantz, American Law Institute Tries to Sidestep 
Conflict of Interest Problems We Documented in Its Dealings With the Tobacco Industry, 
CENTER TOBACCO CONTROL RES. & EDUC. (Feb. 24, 2013 11:08 PM), 
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Recently a legal scholar was trying to confirm the 
accuracy of a citation to the Nimmer treatise made in Summit 
Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co., in 
which Nimmer was quoted as stating “it is accurate to state 
that the Copyright Act bars the importation of gray market 
goods.”168 After all other research avenues proved fruitless, a 
direct appeal was made to the treatise publisher, which 
garnered this reply: 
In 2011, § 8.12 was substantially revised, and its footnotes 
renumbered. Former footnote 104 in that section is now footnote 363. 
Today, that footnote reads as follows: 
See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 
Inc. 523 U.S. 135, 118 S. Ct. 1125, 140 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1998). 
To the extent that it accords a first-sale defense to imported 
items, that case rejects Scorpio. But its holding is arguably 
limited to the reimportation of goods initially manufactured 
in the United States, as will be discussed below, and thus 
can be read as harmonizing with Scorpio’s importation bar 
on goods manufactured and initially sold abroad. See 
§ 8.12[B][6][c] infra. 
Tracking footnote 104 backwards, before 2011 the footnote read 
substantially the same: 
See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 
Inc. 523 U.S. 135, 118 S. Ct. 1125, 140 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1998). 
As will be discussed below, that case rejects Scorpio to the 
extent that it accords a first-sale defense to imported items. 
But its holding is arguably limited to the reimportation of 
goods initially manufactured in the United States, and thus 
can be read as harmonizing with Scorpio’s importation bar 
on goods manufactured and initially sold abroad. See 
§ 8.12[B][6][c] infra. 
That is how the footnote read from 2011 back to 2005, which is as far 
back as my records go. Neither former footnote 104 (as far as I can 
track it) nor revised footnote 363 contains the precise language you 
quote. I do not doubt the accuracy of the attribution; I simply cannot 
confirm it. But the conclusion in the present footnote is similar. 
In case it’s helpful, that conclusion also appears on pages 8-184.34 
and 8-184.35: 
Ironically, therefore, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s 
opinion on the subject—which, albeit subject to endless 
discord, probably represented the best construction of the 
1976 Act before the Supreme Court spoke—de facto remains 
 
 168 Summit Technology, Inc. v. High-Line Medical Instruments Co., 922 F. 
Supp. 299, 312 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (quoting 2 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 61, 
§ 8.12 [B][6] n.104). 
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so even after. 457 If so, then the Copyright Act, subject to the 
various twists and turns catalogued above, in gross fashion 
should still be interpreted to bar the importation of gray 
market goods 458 that have been manufactured abroad. 
I regret that I cannot confirm the contents of the earlier version of 
footnote 104, but hope that the updated treatment of that topic as 
set out above will be of some help.169 
In fairness, the introductory material to the hard copy 
Nimmer treatise includes a statement recommending that, if 
you are relying on something in it, you should make a copy of 
the pages because of the nature of loose leaf publications. So 
David Nimmer is aware of the issue of disappearing law and 
makes an effort to alert treatise users about the problem. But 
he does nothing to solve it. Old versions of the treatise are 
apparently not maintained for posterity, at least not in a way 
that is accessible to those who use it. 
“Link rot” poses perennial difficulties,170 but at least if a 
statute changes, one can find evidence of the amendments in 
the annotations to the statute itself. It is a simple matter to 
ascertain what the changes were, when they were made, and 
even why they were made, at least to some extent, by perusing 
the legislative history and any contemporary media accounts. 
When a Restatement makes changes, they are fully 
documented for similar reasons. This is a far superior approach 
on every measure. 
C. It Might Attract More Copyright Law Geeks into Greater 
ALI Participation 
It is a truism that you can never have too many 
copyright law geeks at a legal conference. At least not if you 
want to maximize the fun factor. 
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